欧盟排放交易体系中拍卖保留价的法律和经济案例

C. Fischer, L. Reins, D. Burtraw, D. Langlet, Åsa Löfgren, M. Mehling, Stefan E. Weishaar, L. Zetterberg, Harro van Asselt, K. Kulovesi
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引用次数: 16

摘要

欧盟排放交易体系(EU ETS)于2005年启动时,预计每吨二氧化碳的价格约为30欧元,并将成为欧盟气候政策的基石。现实情况是,价格不断下跌,私人持有的排放银行不断膨胀,而十年的低价格没有提供足够的动力来推动对实现长期气候目标所必需的技术和创新的投资。欧盟委员会采取了行政措施作为回应,包括推迟引入配额(backloading),并使用基于数量的标准来规范未来的配额销售(市场稳定储备);尽管价格开始回升,但这些措施能否在未来充分支撑价格还远不清楚。与此同时,各国政府一直在放弃碳定价,转而采取重叠的监管措施,这些措施强化了低碳价格,并进一步削弱了人们对以市场为基础的方法应对气候变化的信心。其他碳市场的解决方案是引入底价,在配额拍卖中设定最低价格。反对在欧盟排放交易体系中设置拍卖底价的人士表示,他们担心最低拍卖价格会干扰市场的经济运行,或者相当于征税,从而触发一项需要欧盟成员国一致同意的决策规则。本文回顾了支持和反对拍卖保留价的经济和法律论据。我们的经济分析得出结论,拍卖底价是必要的,以适应重叠的政策,并使配额市场有效运作。我们的法律分析得出的结论是,拍卖底价不是“主要具有财政性质的条款”,也不会“显著影响成员国在不同能源之间的选择”。我们描述了引入保留价格的途径。
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The Legal and Economic Case for an Auction Reserve Price in the EU Emissions Trading System
When it was launched in 2005, the European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) was projected to have prices of around €30/ton CO2 and to be a cornerstone of the EU’s climate policy. The reality was a cascade of falling prices, a ballooning privately held emissions bank, and a decade of low prices providing inadequate incentive to drive investment in the technologies and innovation necessary to achieve long-term climate goals. The European Commission responded with administrative measures, including postponing the introduction of allowances (backloading) and using a quantity-based criterion for regulating future allowance sales (the market stability reserve); although prices are beginning to recover, it is far from clear whether these measures will adequately support the price into the future. In the meantime, governments have been turning away from carbon pricing and adopting overlapping regulatory measures that reinforce low prices and further undermine the confidence in market-based approaches to addressing climate change. The solution in other carbon markets has been the introduction of a reserve price that would set a minimum price in allowance auctions. Opponents of an auction reserve price in the EU ETS have expressed concern that a minimum auction price would interfere with economic operations in the market or would be tantamount to a tax, which would trigger a decision rule requiring unanimity among EU Member States. This Article reviews the economic and legal arguments for and against an auction reserve price. Our economic analysis concludes that an auction reserve price is necessary to accommodate overlapping policies and for the allowance market to operate efficiently. Our legal analysis concludes that an auction reserve price is not a “provision primarily of a fiscal nature,” nor would it “significantly affect a Member State’s choice between different energy sources.” We describe pathways through which a reserve price could be introduced.
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