高频交易者:天使还是魔鬼?

Jeffrey G. MacIntosh
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引用次数: 15

摘要

高频交易(HFT)正在席卷全球资本市场,尤其是在美国和英国,2012年高频交易约占两国股票交易的50%,在欧洲其他地区和加拿大,高频交易的规模也在不断扩大。就对资本市场的影响而言,高频交易员是天使还是魔鬼?批评人士认为是后者,并指责他们将散户和机构投资者置于不利地位。批评人士还将2010年5月6日道指的“闪电崩盘”归咎于高频交易,并称这增加了此类事件再次发生的可能性。有必要对这些观点进行更仔细的研究。在这篇评论中,我首先看看高频交易者做什么,以及高频交易与传统做市商有何不同。然后,我探讨了与高频交易对资本市场的影响有关的经验证据,并仔细研究了高频交易引发的政策问题。在最后一节中,我为政策制定者列出了一些关于高频交易的建议。在调查了高频交易的实证研究后,我得出了高频交易能提高市场质量的结论。例如,它降低了买卖价差,减少了波动性,改善了短期价格发现,并创造了减少经纪人佣金的竞争压力。尽管在速度上处于明显的劣势,但在全球资本市场上,高频交易员的存在使零售交易员实现了净收益。维持订单保护规则并遏制黑池的蔓延:为了防止滥用交易行为,保护客户利益,并在不同的交易场所之间创造一个公平的竞争环境,政策制定者应该通过维持和监管订单保护规则来捍卫统一的订单簿,并最大限度地减少从“亮”市场到“暗池”的交易泄漏。不要干扰创客/接受者定价模式:一些观察人士表示,创客/接受者定价会提高零售交易者的交易成本,因为零售交易订单通常处于市场的活跃端,相关费用会转嫁给客户。然而,在市场上,散户交易员积极的可能性与被动的可能性差不多。制造商/接受者定价可能会提高边际成本,但也会降低买卖价差。关注熔断机制以防止“闪电崩盘”:高频交易员不会造成“闪电崩盘”,而是在市场波动时提供流动性。关注防止类似事件发生的加拿大监管机构应该把重点放在熔断机制上,在市场异常演变为“闪电崩盘”之前阻止它们。
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High Frequency Traders: Angels or Devils?
High frequency trading (HFT) is taking world capital markets by storm, notably in the United States and the United Kingdom, where it accounted for about 50 percent of equities trading in 2012, and to a growing extent in other parts of Europe and in Canada. Are high frequency traders angels or devils in terms of the impact on capital markets? Critics claim the latter and charge that they put retail and institutional investors at a disadvantage. Critics also blame high frequency trading for the “flash crash” on the Dow of May 6 2010 and say it has increased the likelihood of such events happening again. A closer examination of these views is in order. In this Commentary, I first look at what HF traders do and how HFT differs from traditional market making. I then explore the empirical evidence relating to the effect of HFT on capital markets, and canvass the policy issues that HFT raises. In the final section, I list some recommendations for policymakers with respect to HFT. After surveying empirical studies of HFT, I conclude that it enhances market quality. For example, it lowers bid/ask spreads, reduces volatility, improves short-term price discovery, and creates competitive pressures that reduce broker commissions. Despite being at a pronounced speed disadvantage, retail traders have realized a net gain from the presence of HF traders in the world’s capital markets. Maintain the Order Protection Rule and Contain the Spread of Dark Pools: To prevent abusive trading practices, protect client interests, and create a level playing field among different trading venues, policymakers should defend the consolidated order book by maintaining and policing the order protection rule and minimizing the leakage of trading from the “lit” markets to “dark pools.” Do Not Interfere with Maker/Taker Pricing Models: Some observers say maker/taker pricing raises higher trading costs for retail traders, because retail trade orders are typically on the active side of the market, and associated fees are passed on to customers. However, retail traders are about as likely to be on the active as the passive side of the market. Maker/taker pricing may raise costs on the margin, but also lowers bid/ask spreads. Focus on Circuit Breakers to Prevent “Flash Crashes”: HF traders did not cause the “flash crash,” and instead supply liquidity when markets become volatile. Canadian regulators concerned with preventing similar events should focus on circuit breakers to stop market anomalies before they turn into “flash crashes.”
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