海报:云计算中保护隐私的生物特征识别

Changhee Hahn, Junbeom Hur
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引用次数: 4

摘要

Wang等人最近提出了一种保护隐私的生物识别方案。然而,该方案的安全性假设没有捕捉到真实世界攻击的实际方面。在本文中,我们考虑了Wang等人方案中导致生物特征数据泄露的一种实际攻击模型。我们首先展示了我们的攻击模型的可行性,并演示了攻击者如何能够恢复生物特征数据。然后,我们提出了一种新的生物特征识别方案,该方案对攻击模型是安全的。
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POSTER: Towards Privacy-Preserving Biometric Identification in Cloud Computing
Wang et al. recently proposed a privacy-preserving biometric identification scheme. However, the security assumption of the scheme does not capture practical aspects of real world attacks. In this paper, we consider a practical attack model which results in the leakage of biometric data in Wang et al.'s scheme. We first show the feasibility of our attack model and demonstrate how an attacker is able to recover the biometric data. Then, we propose a new biometric identification scheme that is secure against the attack model.
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