{"title":"滥用司法覆核","authors":"Rosalind Dixon, David E. Landau","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192893765.003.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explains the concept of abusive judicial review: the use of courts by regimes to achieve anti-democratic constitutional change. Abusive judicial review involves abusive constitutional borrowing in two distinct senses: first, regimes lean on captured or cowed courts as a strategy to legitimate or advance authoritarian goals, and second, those courts often draw upon liberal democratic doctrines in abusive ways. It develops a typology of two different forms of the phenomenon—a weak form where courts uphold authoritarian moves by political actors, and a strong form where they act more directly to remove obstacles to authoritarian programs. Finally, it draws out two main examples: the Venezuelan Supreme Court’s repression of the opposition-held legislature using a doctrine of ‘legislative omission’ and other tools, and the wielding of militant democracy doctrines by the Cambodian and Thai apex courts to ban parties for authoritarian ends.","PeriodicalId":111680,"journal":{"name":"Abusive Constitutional Borrowing","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Abusive Judicial Review\",\"authors\":\"Rosalind Dixon, David E. Landau\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780192893765.003.0005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter explains the concept of abusive judicial review: the use of courts by regimes to achieve anti-democratic constitutional change. Abusive judicial review involves abusive constitutional borrowing in two distinct senses: first, regimes lean on captured or cowed courts as a strategy to legitimate or advance authoritarian goals, and second, those courts often draw upon liberal democratic doctrines in abusive ways. It develops a typology of two different forms of the phenomenon—a weak form where courts uphold authoritarian moves by political actors, and a strong form where they act more directly to remove obstacles to authoritarian programs. Finally, it draws out two main examples: the Venezuelan Supreme Court’s repression of the opposition-held legislature using a doctrine of ‘legislative omission’ and other tools, and the wielding of militant democracy doctrines by the Cambodian and Thai apex courts to ban parties for authoritarian ends.\",\"PeriodicalId\":111680,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Abusive Constitutional Borrowing\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-06-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Abusive Constitutional Borrowing\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893765.003.0005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Abusive Constitutional Borrowing","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893765.003.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter explains the concept of abusive judicial review: the use of courts by regimes to achieve anti-democratic constitutional change. Abusive judicial review involves abusive constitutional borrowing in two distinct senses: first, regimes lean on captured or cowed courts as a strategy to legitimate or advance authoritarian goals, and second, those courts often draw upon liberal democratic doctrines in abusive ways. It develops a typology of two different forms of the phenomenon—a weak form where courts uphold authoritarian moves by political actors, and a strong form where they act more directly to remove obstacles to authoritarian programs. Finally, it draws out two main examples: the Venezuelan Supreme Court’s repression of the opposition-held legislature using a doctrine of ‘legislative omission’ and other tools, and the wielding of militant democracy doctrines by the Cambodian and Thai apex courts to ban parties for authoritarian ends.