{"title":"集中式DSA网络的数字签名","authors":"C. N. Mathur, K.P. Subbalakshmi","doi":"10.1109/CCNC.2007.209","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Over the past few years there has been a growing demand for radio resources and at the same time these resources are under utilized due to static spectrum allocation techniques. Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) has been thought of as a solution that would satisfy both the growing demand for radio resources and to efficiently utilize the spectrum. The radio devices that have the capability to dynamically sense the spectrum and access the under utilized bands are called cognitive radios (CR). There are two broad classes of users in CR, the primary user is a licensed user of a particular radio frequency band and the secondary users are unlicensed users who cognitively operate without causing harmful interference to the primary user. In this paper we consider a denial attack on centralized DSA networks where a malicious secondary user masquerades as a primary user and effectively shuts off access to all other secondary users. Note that this problem is unique to CR due to the distinction between primary and secondary users. We propose a public key cryptography based primary user identification mechanism that prevents malicious secondary users from masquerading as primary users. We show that the proposed identification mechanism and the associated key management are computationally light weight. We also discuss some advantages and limitations of the proposed identification mechanism.","PeriodicalId":166361,"journal":{"name":"2007 4th IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"81","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Digital Signatures for Centralized DSA Networks\",\"authors\":\"C. N. Mathur, K.P. Subbalakshmi\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CCNC.2007.209\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Over the past few years there has been a growing demand for radio resources and at the same time these resources are under utilized due to static spectrum allocation techniques. Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) has been thought of as a solution that would satisfy both the growing demand for radio resources and to efficiently utilize the spectrum. The radio devices that have the capability to dynamically sense the spectrum and access the under utilized bands are called cognitive radios (CR). There are two broad classes of users in CR, the primary user is a licensed user of a particular radio frequency band and the secondary users are unlicensed users who cognitively operate without causing harmful interference to the primary user. In this paper we consider a denial attack on centralized DSA networks where a malicious secondary user masquerades as a primary user and effectively shuts off access to all other secondary users. Note that this problem is unique to CR due to the distinction between primary and secondary users. We propose a public key cryptography based primary user identification mechanism that prevents malicious secondary users from masquerading as primary users. We show that the proposed identification mechanism and the associated key management are computationally light weight. We also discuss some advantages and limitations of the proposed identification mechanism.\",\"PeriodicalId\":166361,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2007 4th IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference\",\"volume\":\"54 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"81\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2007 4th IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC.2007.209\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2007 4th IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CCNC.2007.209","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past few years there has been a growing demand for radio resources and at the same time these resources are under utilized due to static spectrum allocation techniques. Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) has been thought of as a solution that would satisfy both the growing demand for radio resources and to efficiently utilize the spectrum. The radio devices that have the capability to dynamically sense the spectrum and access the under utilized bands are called cognitive radios (CR). There are two broad classes of users in CR, the primary user is a licensed user of a particular radio frequency band and the secondary users are unlicensed users who cognitively operate without causing harmful interference to the primary user. In this paper we consider a denial attack on centralized DSA networks where a malicious secondary user masquerades as a primary user and effectively shuts off access to all other secondary users. Note that this problem is unique to CR due to the distinction between primary and secondary users. We propose a public key cryptography based primary user identification mechanism that prevents malicious secondary users from masquerading as primary users. We show that the proposed identification mechanism and the associated key management are computationally light weight. We also discuss some advantages and limitations of the proposed identification mechanism.