奥巴马给低工资工人开出的药方:高隐性税收,高保费

Michael F. Cannon
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引用次数: 13

摘要

参众两院的民主党人已经制定了医疗保健立法,其授权、补贴、税收处罚和医疗保险法规将惩罚那些拒绝购买医疗保险的美国人,而奖励他们。因此,这项立法可能会使许多美国人陷入低薪工作,并导致比立法预想的更高的医疗保险费、政府支出和税收。这些命令和补贴将对低收入工人施加有效的边际税率,平均在53%到74%之间,甚至高达82%,在广泛的劳动收入范围内。相比之下,最富有的美国人将面临不高于47.9%的税率。对于较小范围的劳动收入,该立法将征收超过100%的有效边际税率。根据参议院法案,四口之家的有效边际税率将高达174%,根据众议院法案将达到159%。根据参议院的法案,起薪为14,560美元的成年人如果多挣560美元,他们的总收入将因更高的税收和减少的补贴而减少200美元。根据众议院的法案,起价为43670美元的四口之家如果多挣1100美元,他们的总收入将减少870美元。此外,中等收入的工人如果放弃医保,只在生病时购买医疗保险,每年可以节省多达8000美元。事实上,该法案通过强制保险公司在未投保的人生病时以标准保费向他们出售医疗保险,有效地消除了对此类行为的任何惩罚。因此,这项立法将鼓励“逆向选择”——一种不稳定的局面,它将推高保险费、政府支出和税收。
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Obama's Prescription for Low-Wage Workers: High Implicit Taxes, Higher Premiums
House and Senate Democrats have produced health care legislation whose mandates, subsidies, tax penalties, and health insurance regulations would penalize work and reward Americans who refuse to purchase health insurance. As a result, the legislation could trap many Americans in low-wage jobs and cause even higher health-insurance premiums, government spending, and taxes than are envisioned in the legislation.Those mandates and subsidies would impose effective marginal tax rates on low-wage workers that would average between 53 and 74 percent - and even reach as high as 82 percent - over broad ranges of earned income. By comparison, the wealthiest Americans would face tax rates no higher than 47.9 percent.Over smaller ranges of earned income, the legislation would impose effective marginal tax rates that exceed 100 percent. Families of four would see effective marginal tax rates as high as 174 percent under the Senate bill and 159 percent under the House bill. Under the Senate bill, adults starting at $14,560 who earn an additional $560 would see their total income fall by $200 due to higher taxes and reduced subsidies. Under the House bill, families of four starting at $43,670 who earn an additional $1,100 would see their total income fall by $870. In addition, middle-income workers could save as much as $8,000 per year by dropping coverage and purchasing health insurance only when sick. Indeed, the legislation effectively removes any penalty on such behavior by forcing insurers to sell health insurance to the uninsured at standard premiums when they fall ill. The legislation would thus encourage "adverse selection" - an unstable situation that would drive insurance premiums, government spending, and taxes even higher.
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