{"title":"法规与决议:《禁止生物武器公约》能防止恐怖分子获得生物武器吗?","authors":"Sarah Scrivner","doi":"10.1515/JBBBL-2018-0006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"With terrorist attacks becoming everyday occurrences in countries around the world, there is great concern over what types of weapons terrorist groups can access. Although biological weapons are banned under international law, there is still a risk of terrorist organizations obtaining and using them.1 As recently as 2010, The Washington Post reported on illegally manufactured beauty treatments being sold through counterfeit networks and the biosecurity risks they posed.2 Botox derived from one of the “world’s deadliest poisons” began showing up on the black market in Russia in 2006.3 The heavily regulated drug was being manufactured in illegal factories that likely numbered in the dozens, where it was then sold online for anyone to purchase.4 No identification or registration was required to purchase the drugs.5 In 2004, prior to the incidents in Russia, U.S. Justice Department officials raided a string of clinics in five states after uncovering a supply network substituting industrial-grade botulinum toxin for commercial Botox.6 The drug was intended for laboratory research, not cosmetic use, and the illegal sale paralyzed four people.7 Before the emergence of this black market, terrorist attempts at producing and using biological weapons failed due to a lack of sophisticated lab equipment.8 Now the fear is that terrorists can simply buy these biological weapons directly from illegal manufacturers.9 We have seen this done in the past, as Al Qaeda tried to obtain botulinum toxin.10 It would be easy to imagine ISIS—or other terrorist groups—may try to do the same. Terrorist attacks such as bombings can cause immediate mass devastation, but a bioweapon can increase that destruction exponentially.11 In a national security exercise conducted in 2001, the Center for Strategic and International Studiesworkedwith the JohnHopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies to create a “scenario depicting a covert smallpox attack” in the United States.12 In the scenario, the virus first appeared in Oklahoma andwithinweeks, the scenario reported asmany as amillion people in theUnited States estimated to be dead.13 Similar to these working scenarios, if the international community determines it has not taken the necessary measures to prevent a biological attack, it must take appropriate steps to remedy that finding and minimize the threat. This article will look to analyze this issue and recommend steps to make measures more effective, and is laid out as follows: Part II of this article will discuss the Biological Weapons Convention; Part III will cover the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons; Part IV will address Resolution 1540; Part V will be an analysis of how effective the measures are; and Part VI will consist of a brief conclusion.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Regulations & Resolutions: Does The Bwc Prevent Terrorists From Accessing Bioweapons?\",\"authors\":\"Sarah Scrivner\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/JBBBL-2018-0006\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"With terrorist attacks becoming everyday occurrences in countries around the world, there is great concern over what types of weapons terrorist groups can access. Although biological weapons are banned under international law, there is still a risk of terrorist organizations obtaining and using them.1 As recently as 2010, The Washington Post reported on illegally manufactured beauty treatments being sold through counterfeit networks and the biosecurity risks they posed.2 Botox derived from one of the “world’s deadliest poisons” began showing up on the black market in Russia in 2006.3 The heavily regulated drug was being manufactured in illegal factories that likely numbered in the dozens, where it was then sold online for anyone to purchase.4 No identification or registration was required to purchase the drugs.5 In 2004, prior to the incidents in Russia, U.S. Justice Department officials raided a string of clinics in five states after uncovering a supply network substituting industrial-grade botulinum toxin for commercial Botox.6 The drug was intended for laboratory research, not cosmetic use, and the illegal sale paralyzed four people.7 Before the emergence of this black market, terrorist attempts at producing and using biological weapons failed due to a lack of sophisticated lab equipment.8 Now the fear is that terrorists can simply buy these biological weapons directly from illegal manufacturers.9 We have seen this done in the past, as Al Qaeda tried to obtain botulinum toxin.10 It would be easy to imagine ISIS—or other terrorist groups—may try to do the same. Terrorist attacks such as bombings can cause immediate mass devastation, but a bioweapon can increase that destruction exponentially.11 In a national security exercise conducted in 2001, the Center for Strategic and International Studiesworkedwith the JohnHopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies to create a “scenario depicting a covert smallpox attack” in the United States.12 In the scenario, the virus first appeared in Oklahoma andwithinweeks, the scenario reported asmany as amillion people in theUnited States estimated to be dead.13 Similar to these working scenarios, if the international community determines it has not taken the necessary measures to prevent a biological attack, it must take appropriate steps to remedy that finding and minimize the threat. This article will look to analyze this issue and recommend steps to make measures more effective, and is laid out as follows: Part II of this article will discuss the Biological Weapons Convention; Part III will cover the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons; Part IV will address Resolution 1540; Part V will be an analysis of how effective the measures are; and Part VI will consist of a brief conclusion.\",\"PeriodicalId\":415930,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-05-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/JBBBL-2018-0006\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/JBBBL-2018-0006","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulations & Resolutions: Does The Bwc Prevent Terrorists From Accessing Bioweapons?
With terrorist attacks becoming everyday occurrences in countries around the world, there is great concern over what types of weapons terrorist groups can access. Although biological weapons are banned under international law, there is still a risk of terrorist organizations obtaining and using them.1 As recently as 2010, The Washington Post reported on illegally manufactured beauty treatments being sold through counterfeit networks and the biosecurity risks they posed.2 Botox derived from one of the “world’s deadliest poisons” began showing up on the black market in Russia in 2006.3 The heavily regulated drug was being manufactured in illegal factories that likely numbered in the dozens, where it was then sold online for anyone to purchase.4 No identification or registration was required to purchase the drugs.5 In 2004, prior to the incidents in Russia, U.S. Justice Department officials raided a string of clinics in five states after uncovering a supply network substituting industrial-grade botulinum toxin for commercial Botox.6 The drug was intended for laboratory research, not cosmetic use, and the illegal sale paralyzed four people.7 Before the emergence of this black market, terrorist attempts at producing and using biological weapons failed due to a lack of sophisticated lab equipment.8 Now the fear is that terrorists can simply buy these biological weapons directly from illegal manufacturers.9 We have seen this done in the past, as Al Qaeda tried to obtain botulinum toxin.10 It would be easy to imagine ISIS—or other terrorist groups—may try to do the same. Terrorist attacks such as bombings can cause immediate mass devastation, but a bioweapon can increase that destruction exponentially.11 In a national security exercise conducted in 2001, the Center for Strategic and International Studiesworkedwith the JohnHopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies to create a “scenario depicting a covert smallpox attack” in the United States.12 In the scenario, the virus first appeared in Oklahoma andwithinweeks, the scenario reported asmany as amillion people in theUnited States estimated to be dead.13 Similar to these working scenarios, if the international community determines it has not taken the necessary measures to prevent a biological attack, it must take appropriate steps to remedy that finding and minimize the threat. This article will look to analyze this issue and recommend steps to make measures more effective, and is laid out as follows: Part II of this article will discuss the Biological Weapons Convention; Part III will cover the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons; Part IV will address Resolution 1540; Part V will be an analysis of how effective the measures are; and Part VI will consist of a brief conclusion.