法规与决议:《禁止生物武器公约》能防止恐怖分子获得生物武器吗?

Sarah Scrivner
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Terrorist attacks such as bombings can cause immediate mass devastation, but a bioweapon can increase that destruction exponentially.11 In a national security exercise conducted in 2001, the Center for Strategic and International Studiesworkedwith the JohnHopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies to create a “scenario depicting a covert smallpox attack” in the United States.12 In the scenario, the virus first appeared in Oklahoma andwithinweeks, the scenario reported asmany as amillion people in theUnited States estimated to be dead.13 Similar to these working scenarios, if the international community determines it has not taken the necessary measures to prevent a biological attack, it must take appropriate steps to remedy that finding and minimize the threat. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着恐怖袭击在世界各国成为家常便饭,恐怖组织能够获得何种武器备受关注。尽管国际法禁止使用生物武器,但恐怖组织获得和使用生物武器的风险仍然存在就在2010年,《华盛顿邮报》还报道了通过假冒网络销售的非法生产的美容产品,以及它们带来的生物安全风险从“世界上最致命的毒药”中提取出来的肉毒杆菌毒素于2006年开始出现在俄罗斯的黑市上。这种受到严格管制的药物是由可能有几十家的非法工厂生产的,然后在网上出售给任何人购买购买这些药品不需要身份证明或注册2004年,在俄罗斯事件发生之前,美国司法部官员在发现一个用工业级肉毒杆菌毒素代替商业肉毒杆菌毒素的供应网络后,突击搜查了五个州的一系列诊所。这种药物是用于实验室研究,而不是化妆品用途,非法销售使四人瘫痪在这个黑市出现之前,恐怖分子生产和使用生物武器的企图由于缺乏先进的实验室设备而失败现在令人担心的是恐怖分子可以直接从非法制造商那里购买这些生物武器我们在过去看到过这种做法,基地组织曾试图获得肉毒杆菌毒素不难想象,isis——或者其他恐怖组织——可能也会这么做。像爆炸这样的恐怖袭击可以立即造成大规模的破坏,但生物武器可以成倍地增加这种破坏在2001年进行的一次国家安全演习中,战略与国际研究中心与约翰霍普金斯大学民用生物防御研究中心合作,在美国创造了一个“描绘秘密天花袭击的场景”。在这个场景中,病毒首先出现在俄克拉荷马州,在几周内,该场景报告称,美国估计有多达数百万人死亡与这些工作情况类似,如果国际社会确定它没有采取必要措施防止生物攻击,它必须采取适当步骤纠正这一发现并尽量减少威胁。本文将对这一问题进行分析,并提出使各项措施更加有效的建议步骤,具体内容如下:本文第二部分将讨论《生物武器公约》;第三部分将介绍秘书长的调查指称使用化学和生物武器的机制;第四部分将讨论第1540号决议;第五部分将分析这些措施的有效性;第六部分将是一个简短的结论。
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Regulations & Resolutions: Does The Bwc Prevent Terrorists From Accessing Bioweapons?
With terrorist attacks becoming everyday occurrences in countries around the world, there is great concern over what types of weapons terrorist groups can access. Although biological weapons are banned under international law, there is still a risk of terrorist organizations obtaining and using them.1 As recently as 2010, The Washington Post reported on illegally manufactured beauty treatments being sold through counterfeit networks and the biosecurity risks they posed.2 Botox derived from one of the “world’s deadliest poisons” began showing up on the black market in Russia in 2006.3 The heavily regulated drug was being manufactured in illegal factories that likely numbered in the dozens, where it was then sold online for anyone to purchase.4 No identification or registration was required to purchase the drugs.5 In 2004, prior to the incidents in Russia, U.S. Justice Department officials raided a string of clinics in five states after uncovering a supply network substituting industrial-grade botulinum toxin for commercial Botox.6 The drug was intended for laboratory research, not cosmetic use, and the illegal sale paralyzed four people.7 Before the emergence of this black market, terrorist attempts at producing and using biological weapons failed due to a lack of sophisticated lab equipment.8 Now the fear is that terrorists can simply buy these biological weapons directly from illegal manufacturers.9 We have seen this done in the past, as Al Qaeda tried to obtain botulinum toxin.10 It would be easy to imagine ISIS—or other terrorist groups—may try to do the same. Terrorist attacks such as bombings can cause immediate mass devastation, but a bioweapon can increase that destruction exponentially.11 In a national security exercise conducted in 2001, the Center for Strategic and International Studiesworkedwith the JohnHopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies to create a “scenario depicting a covert smallpox attack” in the United States.12 In the scenario, the virus first appeared in Oklahoma andwithinweeks, the scenario reported asmany as amillion people in theUnited States estimated to be dead.13 Similar to these working scenarios, if the international community determines it has not taken the necessary measures to prevent a biological attack, it must take appropriate steps to remedy that finding and minimize the threat. This article will look to analyze this issue and recommend steps to make measures more effective, and is laid out as follows: Part II of this article will discuss the Biological Weapons Convention; Part III will cover the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons; Part IV will address Resolution 1540; Part V will be an analysis of how effective the measures are; and Part VI will consist of a brief conclusion.
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