Locke, Active Power, and a Puzzle about Ascription

Locke holds that the experience of voluntary action is the sole origin of the concept of causal power. What is it about this experience that compels Locke to draw this conclusion? I think this question should puzzle scholars a great deal more than it has. There are three existing interpretations of Locke’s position. The first explanation holds that Locke appeals to voluntary action because he takes this experience to reveal a necessary connection between volition and action; the second holds that Locke is driven to this view by a prior commitment to the claim that mind is inherently active or that only mind is active; and the third holds that Locke takes reflection on the experience of voluntary action to reveal that in virtue of which volition brings about action. However, as I argue, these readings of Locke are inconsistent with the parsimony of his theory of causation and ignore the methodological demands of his empiricism. I submit that, according to Locke, the experience of acting voluntarily, or, equally, the feeling of bringing about change in the world, is a uniquely suitable origin in that its purely qualitative features mirror the characteristics that he deems essential to the concept of causal power.