连体微处理器

Ehsan Aerabi, A. E. Amirouche, Houda Ferradi, R. Géraud, D. Naccache, J. Vuillemin
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在过去的二十年里,研究界已经设计出复杂的方法来从侧信道发射中检索秘密信息,并抵抗这种攻击。本文介绍了一种新的CPU体系结构,称为连体微处理器(CμP)。CμP可以以非常低的额外硬件成本随机地交错执行两个程序。我们为CμP开发了一个预处理器工具,它可以将目标算法转换为两个(或更多)独立的队列,如Q0和Q1,可以交替运行。Q0和Q1完成与原目标算法相同的操作。功率分析电阻是通过随机交替执行Q0和Q1来实现的,不同的运行导致不同的交错。实验结果表明,该结构对CPA攻击是有效的。
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The Conjoined Microprocessor
Over the last twenty years, the research community has devised sophisticated methods for retrieving secret information from side-channel emanations, and for resisting such attacks. This paper introduces a new CPU architecture called the Conjoined Microprocessor (CμP). The CμP can randomly interleave the execution of two programs at very low extra hardware cost. We developed for the CμP a preprocessor tool that turns a target algorithm into two (or more) separate queues like Q0 and Q1 that can run in alternation. Q0 and Q1 fulfill the same operation as the original target algorithm. Power-analysis resistance is achieved by randomly alternating the execution of Q0 and Q1, with different runs resulting in different interleavings. Experiments reveal that this architecture is indeed effective against CPA.
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