A. Famili, M. Foruhandeh, Tolga O. Atalay, A. Stavrou, Haining Wang
{"title":"利用5G定位能力进行GPS欺骗检测","authors":"A. Famili, M. Foruhandeh, Tolga O. Atalay, A. Stavrou, Haining Wang","doi":"10.1109/LATINCOM56090.2022.10000569","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Global Positioning System (GPS) is the most predominant non-authenticated navigation system used in transportation networks for geolocation and timing. The security of GPS is not addressed at the design level, and its implementation is public knowledge, making all GPS-equipped devices susceptible to GPS spoofing attacks. Existing solutions such as cryptography are either not backward compatible or too expensive to implement. Here, we propose an approach without such drawbacks. We present a novel technique to detect GPS spoofing attacks by comparing the final estimated location based on the GPS measurements with that derived by 5G New Radio positioning signals. In case of discrepancy, we detect the GPS spoofing attack and bypass the attacker by replacing the GPS-based localization with 5G-based localization. Our experiments show a detection rate above 98%.","PeriodicalId":221354,"journal":{"name":"2022 IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications (LATINCOM)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"GPS Spoofing Detection by Leveraging 5G Positioning Capabilities\",\"authors\":\"A. Famili, M. Foruhandeh, Tolga O. Atalay, A. Stavrou, Haining Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/LATINCOM56090.2022.10000569\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Global Positioning System (GPS) is the most predominant non-authenticated navigation system used in transportation networks for geolocation and timing. The security of GPS is not addressed at the design level, and its implementation is public knowledge, making all GPS-equipped devices susceptible to GPS spoofing attacks. Existing solutions such as cryptography are either not backward compatible or too expensive to implement. Here, we propose an approach without such drawbacks. We present a novel technique to detect GPS spoofing attacks by comparing the final estimated location based on the GPS measurements with that derived by 5G New Radio positioning signals. In case of discrepancy, we detect the GPS spoofing attack and bypass the attacker by replacing the GPS-based localization with 5G-based localization. Our experiments show a detection rate above 98%.\",\"PeriodicalId\":221354,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2022 IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications (LATINCOM)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-30\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2022 IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications (LATINCOM)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/LATINCOM56090.2022.10000569\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2022 IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications (LATINCOM)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/LATINCOM56090.2022.10000569","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
GPS Spoofing Detection by Leveraging 5G Positioning Capabilities
Global Positioning System (GPS) is the most predominant non-authenticated navigation system used in transportation networks for geolocation and timing. The security of GPS is not addressed at the design level, and its implementation is public knowledge, making all GPS-equipped devices susceptible to GPS spoofing attacks. Existing solutions such as cryptography are either not backward compatible or too expensive to implement. Here, we propose an approach without such drawbacks. We present a novel technique to detect GPS spoofing attacks by comparing the final estimated location based on the GPS measurements with that derived by 5G New Radio positioning signals. In case of discrepancy, we detect the GPS spoofing attack and bypass the attacker by replacing the GPS-based localization with 5G-based localization. Our experiments show a detection rate above 98%.