{"title":"战争地区处于危险中的核电站的历史透视","authors":"L. Sajo-Bohus, J. A. López, M. Castro-colin","doi":"10.31349/suplrevmexfis.4.011002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The past seven decades the design and structural material of nuclear installations has improved and their safety precludes the possibility of severe accidents in GEN-III and III⁺ nuclear power plants (NPP). Zaporizhzhya GEN-III⁺-NPP (Ukraine), is used as subject of discussion. This NPP suffered a military attack this 2022. We discuss the possibility of a severe nuclear accident and the release of radioactive material, as a consequence of an adverse structural damage. Clearly, damage to a GEN-II, -III⁺ reactor dome by military ordnance can only be estimated from data gained during past nuclear accidents in a war zone, or in the neighborhood of military targets. We report historical experiences of reactors in a war zone or under direct military attack. Based on the available data we will discuss possible scenarios applicable to a nuclear installation in Ukraine. The concrete containment of buildings protecting the nuclear vessel and its LEU-fuel loaded core, are not designed to withstand military attacks. We will discuss possible consequences of a severe structural damage due to weaponry. Estimations will be made considering the VVER-1000 Zaporizhzhya ZNPP, class GEN-III+ built near the city of Enerhodar, Ukraine. This reactor has a 2m-plus-steel-reinforced containment. It is also discussed that spent-fuel temporal reservoirs in war zones, are higher-risk structures with higher likelihood of severe radioactive material release than NPP reactors.","PeriodicalId":210091,"journal":{"name":"Suplemento de la Revista Mexicana de Física","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Historical perspective of a nuclear power plant at risk in a war zone\",\"authors\":\"L. Sajo-Bohus, J. A. López, M. Castro-colin\",\"doi\":\"10.31349/suplrevmexfis.4.011002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The past seven decades the design and structural material of nuclear installations has improved and their safety precludes the possibility of severe accidents in GEN-III and III⁺ nuclear power plants (NPP). Zaporizhzhya GEN-III⁺-NPP (Ukraine), is used as subject of discussion. This NPP suffered a military attack this 2022. We discuss the possibility of a severe nuclear accident and the release of radioactive material, as a consequence of an adverse structural damage. Clearly, damage to a GEN-II, -III⁺ reactor dome by military ordnance can only be estimated from data gained during past nuclear accidents in a war zone, or in the neighborhood of military targets. We report historical experiences of reactors in a war zone or under direct military attack. Based on the available data we will discuss possible scenarios applicable to a nuclear installation in Ukraine. The concrete containment of buildings protecting the nuclear vessel and its LEU-fuel loaded core, are not designed to withstand military attacks. We will discuss possible consequences of a severe structural damage due to weaponry. Estimations will be made considering the VVER-1000 Zaporizhzhya ZNPP, class GEN-III+ built near the city of Enerhodar, Ukraine. This reactor has a 2m-plus-steel-reinforced containment. It is also discussed that spent-fuel temporal reservoirs in war zones, are higher-risk structures with higher likelihood of severe radioactive material release than NPP reactors.\",\"PeriodicalId\":210091,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Suplemento de la Revista Mexicana de Física\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Suplemento de la Revista Mexicana de Física\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.31349/suplrevmexfis.4.011002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Suplemento de la Revista Mexicana de Física","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.31349/suplrevmexfis.4.011002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Historical perspective of a nuclear power plant at risk in a war zone
The past seven decades the design and structural material of nuclear installations has improved and their safety precludes the possibility of severe accidents in GEN-III and III⁺ nuclear power plants (NPP). Zaporizhzhya GEN-III⁺-NPP (Ukraine), is used as subject of discussion. This NPP suffered a military attack this 2022. We discuss the possibility of a severe nuclear accident and the release of radioactive material, as a consequence of an adverse structural damage. Clearly, damage to a GEN-II, -III⁺ reactor dome by military ordnance can only be estimated from data gained during past nuclear accidents in a war zone, or in the neighborhood of military targets. We report historical experiences of reactors in a war zone or under direct military attack. Based on the available data we will discuss possible scenarios applicable to a nuclear installation in Ukraine. The concrete containment of buildings protecting the nuclear vessel and its LEU-fuel loaded core, are not designed to withstand military attacks. We will discuss possible consequences of a severe structural damage due to weaponry. Estimations will be made considering the VVER-1000 Zaporizhzhya ZNPP, class GEN-III+ built near the city of Enerhodar, Ukraine. This reactor has a 2m-plus-steel-reinforced containment. It is also discussed that spent-fuel temporal reservoirs in war zones, are higher-risk structures with higher likelihood of severe radioactive material release than NPP reactors.