A. Mensah, Arthur Morris, Han Stice, Roger M. White
{"title":"个人抵押贷款、公共腐败、种族和性别:来自地方反腐的证据","authors":"A. Mensah, Arthur Morris, Han Stice, Roger M. White","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3888069","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We examine how corruption influences the mortgage market. Prior research documents that corruption is most costly in cases, like home buying, where government interaction is frequent and necessary. Accordingly, after anti-corruption laws pass bank-offices both accept more mortgage applications, and offer more favorable terms (without changing future delinquency). These laws are passed largely by cities and counties, so we implement a fixed-effects structure such that our results are driven by lending decisions at the same bank office for mortgage applications across jurisdictions. We also find that the effect of these laws varies by self-reported race and gender.","PeriodicalId":331807,"journal":{"name":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Individual Mortgage Lending, Public Corruption, Race and Gender: Evidence from Local Corruption Crack-Downs\",\"authors\":\"A. Mensah, Arthur Morris, Han Stice, Roger M. White\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3888069\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We examine how corruption influences the mortgage market. Prior research documents that corruption is most costly in cases, like home buying, where government interaction is frequent and necessary. Accordingly, after anti-corruption laws pass bank-offices both accept more mortgage applications, and offer more favorable terms (without changing future delinquency). These laws are passed largely by cities and counties, so we implement a fixed-effects structure such that our results are driven by lending decisions at the same bank office for mortgage applications across jurisdictions. We also find that the effect of these laws varies by self-reported race and gender.\",\"PeriodicalId\":331807,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Banking & Insurance eJournal\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Banking & Insurance eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3888069\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Banking & Insurance eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3888069","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Individual Mortgage Lending, Public Corruption, Race and Gender: Evidence from Local Corruption Crack-Downs
We examine how corruption influences the mortgage market. Prior research documents that corruption is most costly in cases, like home buying, where government interaction is frequent and necessary. Accordingly, after anti-corruption laws pass bank-offices both accept more mortgage applications, and offer more favorable terms (without changing future delinquency). These laws are passed largely by cities and counties, so we implement a fixed-effects structure such that our results are driven by lending decisions at the same bank office for mortgage applications across jurisdictions. We also find that the effect of these laws varies by self-reported race and gender.