{"title":"串通作为环境保护——一种经济评价","authors":"C. Veljanovski","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3693381","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article looks at the relationship between the environment and competition law. It shows that cooperative agreements in industries where there are significant pollution or open access resources such as fisheries may improve economic welfare and the environment. However, except for cooperative agreements among users of open access resources, this is likely to be coincidental and facilitate collusion. The pros and cons of expanding Article 101(3) TFEU to take account of third-party and wider benefits are examined, and whether competition authorities should pursue environmental protection.","PeriodicalId":150569,"journal":{"name":"IO: Theory eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Collusion as Environmental Protection - An Economic Assessment\",\"authors\":\"C. Veljanovski\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3693381\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article looks at the relationship between the environment and competition law. It shows that cooperative agreements in industries where there are significant pollution or open access resources such as fisheries may improve economic welfare and the environment. However, except for cooperative agreements among users of open access resources, this is likely to be coincidental and facilitate collusion. The pros and cons of expanding Article 101(3) TFEU to take account of third-party and wider benefits are examined, and whether competition authorities should pursue environmental protection.\",\"PeriodicalId\":150569,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IO: Theory eJournal\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-09-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IO: Theory eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3693381\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IO: Theory eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3693381","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Collusion as Environmental Protection - An Economic Assessment
This article looks at the relationship between the environment and competition law. It shows that cooperative agreements in industries where there are significant pollution or open access resources such as fisheries may improve economic welfare and the environment. However, except for cooperative agreements among users of open access resources, this is likely to be coincidental and facilitate collusion. The pros and cons of expanding Article 101(3) TFEU to take account of third-party and wider benefits are examined, and whether competition authorities should pursue environmental protection.