使用硬件性能计数器检测控制劫持攻击

Miao Yu, Basel Halak, Mark Zwolinski
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引用次数: 2

摘要

代码重用技术可以绕过现有的安全措施。例如,诸如面向返回编程(ROP)之类的攻击使用现有代码库的片段来创建攻击。由于此代码已经存在于系统中,因此数据执行阻止方法无法阻止此重组代码的执行。现有的基于软件的控制流完整性可以防止这种攻击,但开销很大。大多数改进的方法利用减少的粒度来换取较小的性能开销。基于硬件的检测也面临同样的性能开销和准确性问题。得益于高性能计算在现代CPU芯片上的大面积加载,我们提出了一种基于硬件性能计数器监控的检测方法,是一种轻量级的系统级恶意代码执行检测,解决了其他软硬件安全措施的限制,且不像Control Flow Integrity那样复杂。
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Using Hardware Performance Counters to Detect Control Hijacking Attacks
Code reuse techniques can circumvent existing security measures. For example, attacks such as Return Oriented Programming (ROP) use fragments of the existing code base to create an attack. Since this code is already in the system, the Data Execution Prevention methods cannot prevent the execution of this reorganised code. Existing software-based Control Flow Integrity can prevent this attack, but the overhead is enormous. Most of the improved methods utilise reduced granularity in exchange for a small performance overhead. Hardware-based detection also faces the same performance overhead and accuracy issues. Benefit from HPC's large-area loading on modern CPU chips, we propose a detection method based on the monitoring of hardware performance counters, which is a lightweight system-level detection for malicious code execution to solve the restrictions of other software and hardware security measures, and is not as complicated as Control Flow Integrity.
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