半生不熟的cookie:强化现代Web基于cookie的身份验证

Y. Mundada, N. Feamster, B. Krishnamurthy
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引用次数: 14

摘要

现代网站使用多个身份验证cookie来允许访问者对网站进行不同级别的访问。现代web应用程序的复杂性使得web应用程序程序员很难确保身份验证cookie的使用不会引入漏洞。即使程序员可以访问所有的源代码,这种分析也可能具有挑战性;当web程序员拼凑现成的库来实现身份验证时,这个问题变得更加棘手。我们为现代web程序员组装了一个检查清单,以验证基于cookie的身份验证机制是安全实现的。然后,我们开发了一个工具Newton,帮助web应用程序程序员识别网站特定部分的身份验证cookie,并根据检查表验证它们是否安全实现。我们使用Newton分析了149个网站,包括Alexa排名前200的网站,以及搜索、购物和金融等一系列热门网站。我们发现其中113个网站——包括雅虎、亚马逊和富达等知名网站——容易受到劫持攻击。许多网站已经承认并修复了我们在使用Newton时发现的漏洞,并向他们报告。
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Half-Baked Cookies: Hardening Cookie-Based Authentication for the Modern Web
Modern websites use multiple authentication cookies to allow visitors to the site different levels of access. The complexity of modern web applications can make it difficult for a web application programmer to ensure that the use of authentication cookies does not introduce vulnerabilities. Even when a programmer has access to all of the source code, this analysis can be challenging; the problem becomes even more vexing when web programmers cobble together off-the-shelf libraries to implement authentication. We have assembled a checklist for modern web programmers to verify that the cookie based authentication mechanism is securely implemented. Then, we developed a tool, Newton, to help a web application programmer to identify authentication cookies for specific parts of the website and to verify that they are securely implemented according to the checklist. We used Newton to analyze 149 sites, including the Alexa top-200 and many other popular sites across a range of categories including search, shopping, and finance. We found that 113 of them---including high-profile sites such as Yahoo, Amazon, and Fidelity---were vulnerable to hijacking attacks. Many websites have already acknowledged and fixed the vulnerabilities that we found using Newton and reported to them.
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