SNIFFER:用于企业系统的高精度恶意软件检测器

Evan Chavis, Harrison Davis, Yijun Hou, Matthew Hicks, Salessawi Ferede Yitbarek, T. Austin, V. Bertacco
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在恶意软件攻击和反病毒技术之间的持续战斗中,双方都努力将自己的技术部署在软件系统堆栈的较低层。目标是监视和控制在其自身部署之上的级别上执行的软件,以检测攻击或击败防御。最近的反病毒解决方案甚至低于软件,通过争取硬件支持。然而,到目前为止,他们只是通过监控攻击的软件线索来模仿经典的软件技术。因此,恶意软件可以通过使用变形表现模式轻松地击败它们。通过这项工作,我们提出了一种硬件监控解决方案SNIFFER,它可以跟踪系统级行为中的恶意软件表现,而不是代码模式,因此它无法被绕过,除非恶意软件放弃其本质,即攻击。SNIFFER利用硬件内部功能监控,并使用机器学习来评估系统是否显示出攻击迹象。虚拟嗅探器实现的实验,支持13个功能,并针对五种常见的基于网络的恶意行为进行测试,表明嗅探器几乎100%的时间检测到恶意软件,除非恶意软件积极地限制其攻击。我们的实验还强调了机器学习分类器的需求,它采用了一系列不同的系统特征,因为许多被测试的恶意软件需要多个看似不相连的特征来进行准确检测。
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SNIFFER: A high-accuracy malware detector for enterprise-based systems
In the continual battle between malware attacks and antivirus technologies, both sides strive to deploy their techniques at always lower layers in the software system stack. The goal is to monitor and control the software executing in the levels above their own deployment, to detect attacks or to defeat defenses. Recent antivirus solutions have gone even below the software, by enlisting hardware support. However, so far, they have only mimicked classic software techniques by monitoring software clues of an attack. As a result, malware can easily defeat them by employing metamorphic manifestation patterns. With this work, we propose a hardware-monitoring solution, SNIFFER, which tracks malware manifestations in system-level behavior, rather than code patterns, and it thus cannot be circumvented unless malware renounces its very nature, that is, to attack. SNIFFER leverages in-hardware feature monitoring, and uses machine learning to assess whether a system shows signs of an attack. Experiments with a virtual SNIFFER implementation, which supports 13 features and tests against five common network-based malicious behaviors, show that SNIFFER detects malware nearly 100% of the time, unless the malware aggressively throttle its attack. Our experiments also highlight the need for machine-learning classifiers employing a range of diverse system features, as many of the tested malware require multiple, seemingly disconnected, features for accurate detection.
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