银行监管作为公司治理机制的替代对借款人企业价值的影响:来自印尼上市公司的证据

A. Hermawan, Alexandra Ryan Ahmad Dina
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引用次数: 3

摘要

本研究的目的是考察银行监管作为公司治理机制的替代方案对借款人企业价值的影响。银行对借款人的监控强度是根据银行贷款的规模、监控质量高的银行的贷款规模、银行贷款未偿还期限的长短以及贷款人的数量来衡量的。以2009年印尼证券交易所230家上市公司为样本,采用多元回归模型对研究假设进行检验。实证结果表明,只有监控质量高的银行的贷款规模和放贷者的数量对借款人的企业价值有显著影响。这些发现表明,只有具有高监控质量的银行才能在公司治理中发挥重要作用,从而通过其监控功能增加公司价值。此外,如果一家公司从多家银行借款,那么银行监管的效果就会降低,从而降低公司的价值。
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The Effect of Bank Monitoring as an Alternative of Corporate Governance Mechanism on the Borrowers’ Firm Value: Evidence from Indonesian Listed Firms
The objective of this research is to examine the effect of bank monitoring as an alternative of corporate governance mechanisms on the borrowers’ firm value. The strengths of bank monitoring on the borrowers are measured based on the magnitude of the bank loan, the size of the loan from banks with high monitoring quality, the length of a bank loan outstanding period, and the number of lenders. The research hypotheses were tested using multiple regression model with a sample of 230 companies listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange during 2009. The empirical results show that only the size of the loan from banks with high monitoring quality and the number of lenders significantly influences the borrowers’ firm value. These findings imply that only banks with high monitoring quality could play an important role in the corporate governance and therefore increasing the firm value by their monitoring function. Furthermore, bank monitoring is less effective if a company borrows from many banks, and therefore decreasing the firm value.
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