一种防止“跳过”攻击的方法

2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops Pub Date : 2012-05-24 DOI:10.1109/SPW.2012.14

M. Joye

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引用次数: 10

摘要

直到最近，针对(非crt)基于指数的密码系统的已知错误攻击被认为是相当理论性的，因为它们需要精确的错误注入，例如，一个位翻转。然而，Schmidt和Herbst (FDTC 2008)报告了使用低成本设备在标准模式下对RSA的实际故障攻击。尽管他们的攻击是针对RSA的，但他们很容易扩展到任何其他基于幂的密码系统。本文描述了一种有效的方法来防止这些新的攻击。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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A Method for Preventing "Skipping" Attacks

Until recently, known fault attacks against (non-CRT) exponentiation-based cryptosystems were supposed to be of rather theoretical nature, as they require a precise fault injection, e.g., a bit flip. However, Schmidt and Herbst (FDTC 2008) reported practical fault-attacks against RSA in standard mode using low-cost equipment. Although their attacks were described against RSA, they readily extend to any other exponentiation-based cryptosystem. This paper describes an efficient method to prevent those new attacks.

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2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Workshops

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