使用控制流修改的基于模式的混淆

Sandhya Koteshwara, C. Kim, K. Parhi
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引用次数: 7

摘要

硬件安全已成为一个重要的话题,随着集成电路的威胁日益增加,包括逆向工程,知识产权(IP)盗版和过度建设。本文探讨了电路混淆作为一种硬件安全措施,并专门针对数字信号处理(DSP)电路,这是大多数现代系统的一部分。以快速傅里叶变换(FFT)为例,阐述了利用期望和非期望模式设计模糊DSP函数的思想。模式的选择取决于电路的键输入。据说,只有在使用正确的密钥时,系统才能以所需的操作模式工作。其他不希望出现的模式则是为了迷惑对手。使设计模糊化的方法包括控制流修改,这将使计算偏离期望的模式。我们给出了一个可重构的2并行FFT的仿真和综合结果,并讨论了这种方法的安全性。结果表明,该方法可在8%的面积开销和10%的功率开销下实现可重构和灵活的设计。
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Mode-based Obfuscation using Control-Flow Modifications
Hardware security has emerged as an important topic in the wake of increasing threats on integrated circuits which include reverse engineering, intellectual property (IP) piracy and overbuilding. This paper explores obfuscation of circuits as a hardware security measure and specifically targets digital signal processing (DSP) circuits which are part of most modern systems. The idea of using desired and undesired modes to design obfuscated DSP functions is illustrated using the fast Fourier transform (FFT) as an example. The selection of a mode is dependent on a key input to the circuit. The system is said to work in its desired mode of operation only if the correct key is applied. Other undesired modes are built into the design to confuse an adversary. The approach to obfuscating the design involves control-flow modifications which alter the computations from the desired mode. We present simulation and synthesis results on a reconfigurable, 2-parallel FFT and discuss the security of this approach. It is shown that the proposed approach results in a reconfigurable and flexible design at an area overhead of 8% and a power overhead of 10%.
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