风险资本家对创业的管理参与:好事太多是坏事吗?

April M. Knill
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摘要

风险资本家是为他们投资的公司提供有价值的指导的投资者。风险资本家选择与他的投资组合公司的参与程度。参与的范围从一种非常放松、有限的沟通方式“自由放任”到一种非常参与、几乎令人窒息的“动手”方式。如果风险资本的参与是有价值的,那么更多的参与是更好的,还是好事太多是坏事?这个问题的答案在于风险资本家管理参与与投资组合公司绩效之间关系的本质;具体来说,是线性的还是非线性的。使用汤森路透VentureXpert的数据,我发现在个人电脑绩效和结果中,风险投资参与水平之间存在非线性关系。结果表明,应避免极端程度的VC受累。
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Venture Capitalists’ Managerial Involvement in Entrepreneurships: Is Too Much of a Good Thing Bad?
Venture capitalists are investors that provide valuable hand-holding for the companies in which they invest. A venture capitalist chooses the level of involvement with his portfolio companies. Involvement spans from a very relaxed, limited communication ‘laisse faire’ approach to a very involved, almost stifling, ‘hands on’ approach. If venture capitalist involvement is valuable, is more involvement better, or is too much of a good thing bad? The answer to this question lies in the nature of the relationship between venture capitalist managerial involvement and portfolio company performance; specifically, whether it is linear or nonlinear. Using data from Thomson Reuters VentureXpert, I find that there exists a nonlinear relationship between the level of VC involvement for both PC performance and outcome. Results suggest that extreme levels of VC involvement should be avoided.
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