数字内幕和盈利公告前的知情交易

H. Berkman, Jonathan Jona, Gladys Lee, N. Soderstrom
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引用次数: 3

摘要

虽然人们普遍认为,黑客窃取客户信息导致企业面临越来越大的网络安全风险,但相对未知的网络安全风险是数字内部人(digital insiders)——黑客以企业为目标,获取非公开的企业信息进行非法交易——的信息泄露和随后的交易。我们使用基于10- k文本分析的公司特定网络安全风险缓解措施来代理组织降低数字内幕交易可能性的能力。我们发现,对于网络安全风险缓解得分较低的公司,在发布收益公告之前,更大比例的新收益信息被纳入价格。我们还发现,对于网络安全风险缓解程度较低的公司,卖空者的公告前交易更能预测收益意外。此外,在临近财报公布的日子里,网络安全风险缓解得分相对较低的公司,其买卖价差(尤其是逆向选择部分)的涨幅更大。这些结果表明,薄弱的网络安全风险缓解为获取私人信息提供了机会,知情的交易员更有可能在遭受网络犯罪风险较高的公司的股票中进行交易。
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Digital Insiders and Informed Trading Before Earnings Announcements
While it is widely acknowledged that companies face increasing cybersecurity risk stemming from hackers stealing customer information, a relatively unknown cybersecurity risk is from information leakage and subsequent trading by digital insiders – hackers who target corporations to obtain non-public corporate information for illegal trading. We use a firm-specific measure of cybersecurity risk mitigation based on textual analysis of 10-Ks to proxy for the organization’s ability to reduce the probability of digital insider trading. We find that a larger share of new earnings information is incorporated into prices prior to earnings announcements for firms with low cybersecurity risk mitigation scores. We also find that pre-announcement trading by short sellers is more predictive of earnings surprises for firms with low cybersecurity risk mitigation. Further, on days closer to earnings announcements, firms with relatively low cybersecurity risk mitigation scores experience a larger increase in bid-ask spreads, particularly the adverse selection component. These results suggest that weak cybersecurity risk mitigation provides opportunities for acquisition of private information and that trading by privately informed traders is more likely in stocks of firms with higher exposure to cybercrimes.
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