{"title":"为什么规范被忽视?集体行动和隐私共享","authors":"R. Sloan, Richard Warner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3125832","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Informational privacy is the ability to govern when others may collect your information and how they may use it. Norms can, and do, provide such governance, as Helen Nissenbaum’s seminal work shows. The relevant norms are informational norms, social norms that govern the collection, use, and distribution of information. With noteworthy exceptions (Woodrow Hartzog and Neil Richards, for example), contemporary discussions of privacy rarely mention informational norms, or at best assign them a peripheral role. We claim they should play a central role. Our argument is that ensuring adequate informational privacy is (at least in part) a collective action problem. Norms can, and often do, solve collective action problems. Further, informational norms currently do solve a wide range of important collective action problems centered around privacy. 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We thereby link norm-created privacy to a rich body of empirical and theoretical work. We hope the resulting theory of norm-created governance of information flows contributes to the understanding of privacy that Neil Richards and Jonathan King call for in Big Data Ethics: “privacy in the age of big data should be . . . understood as the need to expand the rules we use to govern the flows of personal information.”","PeriodicalId":179517,"journal":{"name":"Information Privacy Law eJournal","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Why Are Norms Ignored? Collective Action and the Privacy Commons\",\"authors\":\"R. 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引用次数: 1
摘要
信息隐私是指管理他人何时可以收集您的信息以及如何使用这些信息的能力。正如海伦·尼森鲍姆(Helen Nissenbaum)的开创性著作所显示的那样,规范能够、也确实提供了这样的治理。相关规范是信息规范,即管理信息收集、使用和分发的社会规范。除了值得注意的例外(例如,伍德罗·哈特佐格和尼尔·理查兹),当代关于隐私的讨论很少提及信息规范,或者至多将其置于次要地位。我们认为他们应该发挥核心作用。我们的论点是,确保足够的信息隐私(至少部分)是一个集体行动问题。规范能够而且经常解决集体行动问题。此外,信息规范目前确实解决了一系列以隐私为中心的重要集体行动问题。在有关信息隐私的提案中,信息规范不应该占据中心位置吗?我们通过回答反对赋予他们这一角色的三个反对意见,认为他们应该这样做。(1)缺乏规范:技术的快速进步造成了各种各样的情况,而这些情况不受相关规范的约束。(2)规范的分歧:即使存在相关规范,但由于对其内容缺乏共识,使其成为构建公共政策的不良基础。(3)缺乏适当的理论:即使规范存在,其内容也没有争议,规范也是公共政策的一个糟糕工具,因为没有适当的理论允许人们对规范的因果做出准确的预测。前两个反对意见的答案相对简单。第三点是最根本的。我们概述了一种理论,它将规范创建的信息隐私视为一种公共资源——一种特殊的公共资源,一种公共资源池。因此,我们将规范创造的隐私与丰富的实证和理论工作联系起来。我们希望由此产生的规范创建的信息流治理理论有助于理解尼尔·理查兹(Neil Richards)和乔纳森·金(Jonathan King)在《大数据伦理学》(Big Data Ethics)中所呼吁的隐私:“大数据时代的隐私应该是……理解为需要扩大我们用来管理个人信息流动的规则。”
Why Are Norms Ignored? Collective Action and the Privacy Commons
Informational privacy is the ability to govern when others may collect your information and how they may use it. Norms can, and do, provide such governance, as Helen Nissenbaum’s seminal work shows. The relevant norms are informational norms, social norms that govern the collection, use, and distribution of information. With noteworthy exceptions (Woodrow Hartzog and Neil Richards, for example), contemporary discussions of privacy rarely mention informational norms, or at best assign them a peripheral role. We claim they should play a central role. Our argument is that ensuring adequate informational privacy is (at least in part) a collective action problem. Norms can, and often do, solve collective action problems. Further, informational norms currently do solve a wide range of important collective action problems centered around privacy. Shouldn’t informational norms take center stage in proposals about informational privacy?
We argue they should by answering three objections to giving them that role. (1) Lack of norms: Rapid advances in technology have created a wide variety of situations for which are not governed by relevant norms. (2) Disagreement about norms: Even if relevant norms exist, lack of agreement about their content makes them a poor foundation on which to build public policy. (3) Lack of an adequate theory: Even if norms exist and their content is uncontroversial, norms are a poor tool for public policy because there is no adequate theory that allows one to make accurate predictions about the causes and effects of norms. The first two objections have relatively easy answers. The third is fundamental. We outline a theory that treats norm-created informational privacy as a commons—a special kind of commons, a common pool resource. We thereby link norm-created privacy to a rich body of empirical and theoretical work. We hope the resulting theory of norm-created governance of information flows contributes to the understanding of privacy that Neil Richards and Jonathan King call for in Big Data Ethics: “privacy in the age of big data should be . . . understood as the need to expand the rules we use to govern the flows of personal information.”