辩护者的困境

Nathan L. King
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摘要

第七章考虑了在一个要求谦卑的知识环境中,宗教辩护者如何面对她的论点的理性力量的两难境地。她通常会认为,即使面对不同意见,他们也会使她自己的信仰变得合理。辩护者是否应该认为那些不同意她的人——即使在听了她的论点之后——在否认她的信仰或暂停对他们的判断方面是理性的?对这些问题的肯定和否定的回答都有潜在的代价——因此,这就是两难。一种方法是指责道歉者傲慢,暗示她的观点有“压倒性的论据”。第二条道路可能会使辩护者的事业变得不连贯,破坏她所主张的信念。本章旨在表明辩护者不能明智地将她对宗教分歧和辩护策略的看法与她对认识论和宗教哲学中的其他问题的看法分开。
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The Apologist’s Dilemma
Chapter 7 considers how, in an intellectual setting that calls for humility, the religious apologist faces a dilemma about the rational force of her arguments. She will typically think that they render her own beliefs rational, even in the face of disagreement. Should the apologist think that those who disagree with her—even after hearing her arguments—are rational in denying her beliefs, or in suspending judgment about them? Both affirmative and negative answers to these questions come with potential costs—thus, the dilemma. One path subjects the apologist to charges of arrogance, suggesting she has “knockdown arguments” for her views. The second path threatens to make the apologist’s enterprise incoherent, undermining the very beliefs for which she argues. The chapter aims to show that the apologist cannot sensibly isolate her views about religious disagreement and apologetic strategy from her views about other issues in epistemology and the philosophy of religion.
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