COVID-19救助

J. Meier, Jake Smith
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引用次数: 9

摘要

我们使用手工收集的数据来调查COVID-19对所有上市美国公司的救助。接受救助的公司税率中值为4%,未接受救助的公司税率中值为16%。与过去接受救助的公司缴纳的企业所得税相比,此次救助的成本很高。我们计算了接受救助的企业需要缴纳企业所得税的年数,才能产生与救助所得相同的税收:薪水保护计划为135.0年,航空公司救助为267.9年。我们也记录了救助的阴暗面。对许多公司来说,救助似乎是一笔意外之财。许多接受救助的国家做出了冒险的财务决定,因此救助他们可能会引发道德风险。此外,游说支出正预示着救助的可能性和金额。
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The COVID-19 Bailouts
We use hand-collected data to investigate the COVID-19 bailouts for all publicly listed US firms. The median tax rate is 4% for bailout firms and 16% for no-bailout firms. The bailouts are expensive when compared to past corporate income tax payments of the bailout firms. We compute the number of years a bailout recipient has to pay corporate income tax to generate as much tax revenue as it received in bailouts: 135.0 years for the Paycheck Protection Program and 267.9 years for the airline bailouts. We also document a dark side of the bailouts. For many firms, the bailouts appear to be a windfall. Numerous bailout recipients made risky financial decisions, so bailing them out might induce moral hazard. Moreover, lobbying expenditures positively predict the bailout likelihood and amount.
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