国有、隐性政府救助担保与崩溃风险:来自中国的证据

Mingfa Ding, Zhongda He, Yuecheng Jia, Minggao Shen
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本研究以中国上市公司为样本,证明了政府通过国有制进行干预可以缓解股灾风险。在危机时期和中央政府持有股份的公司样本中,国有制的缓解效应更为明显。进一步的证据表明,高国有程度通过阻止卖空活动,降低了崩盘风险。实证结果表明,卖空者尤其是知情卖空者,将高国有率视为政府对企业破产的隐性救助担保,并主动退出做空股票。知情卖空活动的减少阻碍了坏消息的纳入。
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State Ownership, Implicit Government Bailout Guarantee, and Crash Risk: Evidence From China
Using a large sample of the Chinese public firms, this study documents that the government intervention via state ownership can mitigate the stock crash risk. The mitigation effect of state ownership is more pronounced in the crisis periods and in the sample of firms with shares held by central government. Further evidence indicates that high state ownership mitigates the crash risk by deterring the short selling activities. Our empirical results reveal that short sellers especially informed short sellers, view high state ownership as the implicit government bailout guarantee against bankruptcy and voluntarily withdraw shares shorted. The decreased informed short selling activities block the incorporation of bad news.
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