{"title":"使用SIP身份,防止ZRTP受到中间人攻击","authors":"O. Jung, M. Petraschek, T. Hoeher, I. Gojmerac","doi":"10.1109/WD.2008.4812920","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we present an architecture and associated protocol extensions for securing the media stream of a VoIP session. We make use of ZRTP which is a key agreement protocol that allows two parties to agree upon a secret session key over the media path. Because ZRTP is based on the popular Diffie-Hellmann key exchange mechanism it is inherently vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Although ZRTP offers a mechanism for the prevention of MITM attacks, a sophisticated attacker might be able to launch a successful attack in certain scenarios. We describe an approach that provides authentic cryptographic parameters for ZRTP without sacrificing the independence from a user-level Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). We propose to use the mechanisms provided by RFC 4474 (SIP Identity) to ensure the identity of the parties involved in an ZRTP key exchange.","PeriodicalId":247938,"journal":{"name":"2008 1st IFIP Wireless Days","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Using SIP identity to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks on ZRTP\",\"authors\":\"O. Jung, M. Petraschek, T. Hoeher, I. Gojmerac\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/WD.2008.4812920\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper we present an architecture and associated protocol extensions for securing the media stream of a VoIP session. We make use of ZRTP which is a key agreement protocol that allows two parties to agree upon a secret session key over the media path. Because ZRTP is based on the popular Diffie-Hellmann key exchange mechanism it is inherently vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Although ZRTP offers a mechanism for the prevention of MITM attacks, a sophisticated attacker might be able to launch a successful attack in certain scenarios. We describe an approach that provides authentic cryptographic parameters for ZRTP without sacrificing the independence from a user-level Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). We propose to use the mechanisms provided by RFC 4474 (SIP Identity) to ensure the identity of the parties involved in an ZRTP key exchange.\",\"PeriodicalId\":247938,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2008 1st IFIP Wireless Days\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2008 1st IFIP Wireless Days\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/WD.2008.4812920\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2008 1st IFIP Wireless Days","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/WD.2008.4812920","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Using SIP identity to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks on ZRTP
In this paper we present an architecture and associated protocol extensions for securing the media stream of a VoIP session. We make use of ZRTP which is a key agreement protocol that allows two parties to agree upon a secret session key over the media path. Because ZRTP is based on the popular Diffie-Hellmann key exchange mechanism it is inherently vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Although ZRTP offers a mechanism for the prevention of MITM attacks, a sophisticated attacker might be able to launch a successful attack in certain scenarios. We describe an approach that provides authentic cryptographic parameters for ZRTP without sacrificing the independence from a user-level Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). We propose to use the mechanisms provided by RFC 4474 (SIP Identity) to ensure the identity of the parties involved in an ZRTP key exchange.