到底是什么导致了抵押贷款违约、再违约和修改

Kyle F. Herkenhoff
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引用次数: 7

摘要

我使用新的家庭层面的数据来同时检验关于抵押贷款违约的主要原因的三个相互竞争的假设。我考虑了个人失业咒语、负资产和无担保债务之间的潜在相互作用。与过去只能控制地区失业率的研究不同,我发现,正如文献中广泛假设的那样,失业和负资产的双重触发事件在决定违约方面至关重要。在所考虑的每一种规范中,失业和负资产之间的相互作用项都是显著的,这表明双重触发事件是产生持续违约的罪魁祸首,正如Foote、Gerardi和Willen(2009)所假设的那样。我发现一个拥有负资产并且失业的人违约的可能性比只有负资产的人高10%负资产本身只会使一个人违约的可能性增加1.45%,比互动概率小6倍。与负资产和失业相比,无担保债务扮演着第三大角色,过去的修改使人们在调查日期违约的可能性增加了20%。重新违约,即修改后的违约,也可以通过失业和负资产之间的相互作用很好地预测,而修改最好是通过过去的负资产来预测,这使得某人接受修改的可能性增加8%。
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What Actually Causes Mortgage Defaults, Redefaults, and Modifications
I use new household level data to simultaneously test three competing hypothesis about the primary cause of mortgage default. I consider the potential interactions of individual unemployment spells, negative equity, and unsecured debt. Unlike past studies that were only able to control for regional unemployment rates, I find that the double trigger event of job loss and negative equity is crucial in determining default as has been widely hypothesized in the literature. In every specification considered, the interaction term between unemployment and negative equity is significant indicating that double trigger events are the culprit in generating persistent defaults as hypothesized by Foote, Gerardi, and Willen (2009). I find that a person who has negative equity and who is unemployed is 10% more likely to default than a person who has just negative equity. The negative equity alone only makes a person 1.45% more likely to default, a factor of 6 smaller than the interaction probability. Unsecured debt plays a tertiary role compared to negative equity and unemployment, and past modifications make someone 20% more likely to have defaulted at the survey date. Redefaults, which are defaults after modification, are also well predicted by an interaction between unemployment and negative equity, and modifications are best predicted by past negative equity which makes someone 8% more likely to receive a modification.
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