{"title":"知识产权改革的组织视角","authors":"Jonathan M. Barnett","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190908591.003.0009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter presents a novel organizational perspective on “patent reform” in the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress, and the federal courts during 2006–2020. Debates between proponents of strong and weaker patents can be understood as a conflict between entities that rely on integrated business models for monetizing R&D, which deploy non-IP complementary assets to capture returns on innovation, and entities that rely on non-integrated business models, which monetize R&D through licensing and other IP-dependent contractual relationships. Weak-IP regimes induce an organizational bias that favors integrated and platform-based firms that capture returns on innovation within internal capital and information markets while impeding entry by smaller, R&D-specialized entities that capture returns on innovation through external capital and informational markets. By contrast, strong-IP regimes enable firms and other entities to select from the full range of more and less integrated structures for executing the innovation and commercialization process.","PeriodicalId":143182,"journal":{"name":"Innovators, Firms, and Markets","volume":"68 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Organizational Perspectives on Intellectual-Property Reform\",\"authors\":\"Jonathan M. Barnett\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780190908591.003.0009\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter presents a novel organizational perspective on “patent reform” in the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress, and the federal courts during 2006–2020. Debates between proponents of strong and weaker patents can be understood as a conflict between entities that rely on integrated business models for monetizing R&D, which deploy non-IP complementary assets to capture returns on innovation, and entities that rely on non-integrated business models, which monetize R&D through licensing and other IP-dependent contractual relationships. Weak-IP regimes induce an organizational bias that favors integrated and platform-based firms that capture returns on innovation within internal capital and information markets while impeding entry by smaller, R&D-specialized entities that capture returns on innovation through external capital and informational markets. By contrast, strong-IP regimes enable firms and other entities to select from the full range of more and less integrated structures for executing the innovation and commercialization process.\",\"PeriodicalId\":143182,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Innovators, Firms, and Markets\",\"volume\":\"68 4 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Innovators, Firms, and Markets\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190908591.003.0009\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Innovators, Firms, and Markets","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190908591.003.0009","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Organizational Perspectives on Intellectual-Property Reform
This chapter presents a novel organizational perspective on “patent reform” in the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress, and the federal courts during 2006–2020. Debates between proponents of strong and weaker patents can be understood as a conflict between entities that rely on integrated business models for monetizing R&D, which deploy non-IP complementary assets to capture returns on innovation, and entities that rely on non-integrated business models, which monetize R&D through licensing and other IP-dependent contractual relationships. Weak-IP regimes induce an organizational bias that favors integrated and platform-based firms that capture returns on innovation within internal capital and information markets while impeding entry by smaller, R&D-specialized entities that capture returns on innovation through external capital and informational markets. By contrast, strong-IP regimes enable firms and other entities to select from the full range of more and less integrated structures for executing the innovation and commercialization process.