{"title":"非常手段和故意终止生命","authors":"Helga Kuhse","doi":"10.1016/0271-5392(81)90013-7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Physicians and their professional organizations often distinguish between ordinary and extra-ordinary means of treatment. The moral relevance of this distinction, which has recently been defended by the philosopher Bonnie Steinbock (The Intentional Termination of Life. <em>Ethics Sci. Med.</em> <strong>6</strong>, 59, 1979.). is challenged. It is argued that neither this nor the “overlapping distinction” between intention and foresight is morally significant. If deliberate cessation of ordinary treatment, resulting in the foreseen death of the patient, is the intentional termination of life—so is the deliberate cessation of extraordinary treatment.</p><p>Two interrelated arguments are advanced in support of the claim that the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of life-support has no moral significance. The first is based on Steinbeck's own criterion for the intentional termination of life (“if one acts intentionally, foreseeing that a particular result will occur, one can be said to have brought about the result intentionally”), the second suggests that the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means is a distinction not between different <em>means</em> but between lives judged worthy of prolongation and those not: it is a quality-of-life criterion. This explains why the concept of extraordinary means is “flexible”, why “what might be considered ‘extraordinary’ in one situation might be ordinary in another”.</p><p>But if we do not admit that quality-of-life considerations rather than “means” are at issue, then we cannot give an adequate answer as to why it may. for example, be morally permissible to switch off the respirator when it sustains an irreversibly comatose patient but not when it sustains a patient with a respiratory disease. It is argued that when the physician intentionally flicks the switch to turn off the respirator, foreseeing the death of the patient, then he has brought about the death intentionally and it does not matter whether we call the respirator in the first case an “extraordinary” and in the second case an “ordinary” means. The deliberate cessation of life-prolonging treatment is the intentional termination of life—either passive euthanasis or. if the patient against his doctor's advice, refuses further treatment. passive suicide.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":79378,"journal":{"name":"Social science & medicine. 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If deliberate cessation of ordinary treatment, resulting in the foreseen death of the patient, is the intentional termination of life—so is the deliberate cessation of extraordinary treatment.</p><p>Two interrelated arguments are advanced in support of the claim that the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of life-support has no moral significance. The first is based on Steinbeck's own criterion for the intentional termination of life (“if one acts intentionally, foreseeing that a particular result will occur, one can be said to have brought about the result intentionally”), the second suggests that the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means is a distinction not between different <em>means</em> but between lives judged worthy of prolongation and those not: it is a quality-of-life criterion. This explains why the concept of extraordinary means is “flexible”, why “what might be considered ‘extraordinary’ in one situation might be ordinary in another”.</p><p>But if we do not admit that quality-of-life considerations rather than “means” are at issue, then we cannot give an adequate answer as to why it may. for example, be morally permissible to switch off the respirator when it sustains an irreversibly comatose patient but not when it sustains a patient with a respiratory disease. It is argued that when the physician intentionally flicks the switch to turn off the respirator, foreseeing the death of the patient, then he has brought about the death intentionally and it does not matter whether we call the respirator in the first case an “extraordinary” and in the second case an “ordinary” means. 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引用次数: 4
摘要
医生和他们的专业组织经常区分普通和特别的治疗手段。最近,哲学家邦妮·斯坦伯克(Bonnie Steinbock)在《故意终止生命》(The Intentional Termination of Life)一书中为这种区别的道德意义进行了辩护。道德科学。医学。6,59,1979。)。是挑战。有人认为,无论是这一点,还是意图和预见之间的“重叠区分”,在道德上都不重要。如果故意停止普通治疗,导致病人预见死亡,是故意终止生命,那么故意停止特殊治疗也是故意终止生命。有两个相互关联的论点支持这样一种说法,即区分普通和特殊的维持生命的手段没有道德意义。第一个是基于斯坦贝克自己的故意终止生命的标准(“如果一个人故意行动,预见到一个特定的结果会发生,他可以说是故意带来了这个结果”),第二个表明,普通手段和特殊手段之间的区别不是不同手段之间的区别,而是被认为值得延长的生命和那些不值得延长的生命之间的区别:这是一个生活质量标准。这就解释了为什么特别手段的概念是“灵活的”,为什么“在一种情况下可能被认为是‘特别的’,在另一种情况下可能是普通的”。但是,如果我们不承认在争论的是生活质量的考虑而不是“手段”,那么我们就不能给出一个充分的答案来解释为什么会这样。例如,在道义上允许关掉呼吸机,当它维持一个不可逆转的昏迷病人,但当它维持一个呼吸系统疾病的病人。有人认为,当医生预见到病人的死亡,故意拨动开关关闭呼吸器时,那么他就故意造成了病人的死亡,我们是否把呼吸器称为第一种“特殊”手段,而把呼吸器称为第二种“普通”手段并不重要。故意停止延长生命的治疗是故意终止生命——要么是被动安乐死,要么是安乐死。如果病人不听医嘱,拒绝进一步治疗。被动的自杀。
Extraordinary means and the intentional termination of life
Physicians and their professional organizations often distinguish between ordinary and extra-ordinary means of treatment. The moral relevance of this distinction, which has recently been defended by the philosopher Bonnie Steinbock (The Intentional Termination of Life. Ethics Sci. Med.6, 59, 1979.). is challenged. It is argued that neither this nor the “overlapping distinction” between intention and foresight is morally significant. If deliberate cessation of ordinary treatment, resulting in the foreseen death of the patient, is the intentional termination of life—so is the deliberate cessation of extraordinary treatment.
Two interrelated arguments are advanced in support of the claim that the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means of life-support has no moral significance. The first is based on Steinbeck's own criterion for the intentional termination of life (“if one acts intentionally, foreseeing that a particular result will occur, one can be said to have brought about the result intentionally”), the second suggests that the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means is a distinction not between different means but between lives judged worthy of prolongation and those not: it is a quality-of-life criterion. This explains why the concept of extraordinary means is “flexible”, why “what might be considered ‘extraordinary’ in one situation might be ordinary in another”.
But if we do not admit that quality-of-life considerations rather than “means” are at issue, then we cannot give an adequate answer as to why it may. for example, be morally permissible to switch off the respirator when it sustains an irreversibly comatose patient but not when it sustains a patient with a respiratory disease. It is argued that when the physician intentionally flicks the switch to turn off the respirator, foreseeing the death of the patient, then he has brought about the death intentionally and it does not matter whether we call the respirator in the first case an “extraordinary” and in the second case an “ordinary” means. The deliberate cessation of life-prolonging treatment is the intentional termination of life—either passive euthanasis or. if the patient against his doctor's advice, refuses further treatment. passive suicide.