基于随机离散序列异常检测的联合攻击防御

Chia-Mei Chen, G. Lai, P. Young
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引用次数: 6

摘要

为了逃避检测,黑客可能会使用僵尸网络,一组受感染的机器,试图获得目标的访问权限,并且在指示攻击执行后,僵尸机器将结果报告给命令和控制服务器。由于探索或试图登录目标的机器可能会被网络中安装的防御机制捕获和阻止,黑客会使用另一台干净的僵尸机利用僵尸网络收集的访问信息登录目标。这种攻击顺序被称为“侦察兵-指挥官”联合攻击,侦察兵负责扫描和探测目标的漏洞,指挥官利用侦察兵提供的正确登录信息进行精确打击。检测系统会认为接入正常,很难识别出这种协同攻击。为了识别攻击序列,本研究将网络信息与系统日志相关联,找到攻击序列,并在实际损害造成之前的早期识别潜在的侦察兵和指挥员。本文采用描述序列数据常用的隐马尔可夫模型来预测可能的联合攻击,防止实际损害。实验结果表明,该防御机制能够在早期有效识别联合攻击,防止网络进一步受损。
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Defense Joint Attacks Based on Stochastic Discrete Sequence Anomaly Detection
To evade detection, hackers may use a botnet, a set of compromised machines, to attempt to gain the access of a target and the bot machines report the results to the command and control server after the instructed attack has been performed. As the machines which explore or attempt login to the target might be captured and blocked by the defense mechanism installed in the network, the hacker would use another clean zombie machine to login the target using the access information collected by the botnet. Such attack sequence is called "Scouts-and-Commander" joint attack, where scouts take charge of scanning and exploring the vulnerability of a target and commander launches the precise strike using the correct login information provided by scouts. The detection system would consider the access normal, it is hard to identify such collaborative attack. In order to identify the attack sequence, this study correlates network information and system logs to find the attack sequence and identifies the potential scouts and commanders in the early stage before real damage has been done. In this paper, hidden Markov model often used to describe sequential data is adopted to forecast possible joint attacks and to prevent real damage. The experimental results show that the proposed defense mechanism can identify the joint attacks in the early stage efficiently to prevent further damage in the networks.
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