自然灾害后的大浴会计

Yingmei Cheng, Jongha Park, Spencer R. Pierce, Tianming Zhang
{"title":"自然灾害后的大浴会计","authors":"Yingmei Cheng, Jongha Park, Spencer R. Pierce, Tianming Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3305478","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Practitioners and academics widely suspect that managers engage in “big bath” reporting behavior as a form of earnings management, but conclusive evidence of this behavior has been difficult to document due to the inherently endogenous nature of reporting the large nonrecurring charges necessary to engage in a big bath. We introduce a novel dataset of natural disasters to address this problem and argue that natural disasters provide an ideal exogenous shock to examine big baths. Consistent with opportunistic reporting, we find that, relative to both matched firms unaffected by a natural disaster and matched firms affected by the same natural disaster that do not report large, negative special items, big bath firms experience greater improvements in post-disaster earnings for multiple years and higher future stock returns. We also find that CEOs of bath firms receive relatively larger increases in bonus and cash compensation in the years following the natural disaster. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers take advantage of the occurrence of natural disasters by engaging in opportunistic big bath reporting behavior.","PeriodicalId":181062,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Disclosure","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Big Bath Accounting Following Natural Disasters\",\"authors\":\"Yingmei Cheng, Jongha Park, Spencer R. Pierce, Tianming Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3305478\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Practitioners and academics widely suspect that managers engage in “big bath” reporting behavior as a form of earnings management, but conclusive evidence of this behavior has been difficult to document due to the inherently endogenous nature of reporting the large nonrecurring charges necessary to engage in a big bath. We introduce a novel dataset of natural disasters to address this problem and argue that natural disasters provide an ideal exogenous shock to examine big baths. Consistent with opportunistic reporting, we find that, relative to both matched firms unaffected by a natural disaster and matched firms affected by the same natural disaster that do not report large, negative special items, big bath firms experience greater improvements in post-disaster earnings for multiple years and higher future stock returns. We also find that CEOs of bath firms receive relatively larger increases in bonus and cash compensation in the years following the natural disaster. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers take advantage of the occurrence of natural disasters by engaging in opportunistic big bath reporting behavior.\",\"PeriodicalId\":181062,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Governance: Disclosure\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-12-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"10\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Governance: Disclosure\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3305478\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance: Disclosure","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3305478","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 10

摘要

从业者和学者普遍怀疑,管理者参与“大浴”报告行为是盈余管理的一种形式,但由于报告参与大浴所必需的大量非经常性费用的内在内生性质,这种行为的确凿证据很难记录。我们引入了一个新的自然灾害数据集来解决这个问题,并认为自然灾害提供了一个理想的外生冲击来检验大浴场。与机会主义报告一致,我们发现,相对于未受自然灾害影响的匹配公司和受同一自然灾害影响的匹配公司,大公司在灾后多年的收益和更高的未来股票回报方面都有更大的改善。我们还发现,在自然灾害发生后的几年中,卫浴企业的ceo在奖金和现金补偿方面的增幅相对较大。总的来说,我们的证据表明,管理者通过参与机会主义的大浴报告行为来利用自然灾害的发生。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Big Bath Accounting Following Natural Disasters
Practitioners and academics widely suspect that managers engage in “big bath” reporting behavior as a form of earnings management, but conclusive evidence of this behavior has been difficult to document due to the inherently endogenous nature of reporting the large nonrecurring charges necessary to engage in a big bath. We introduce a novel dataset of natural disasters to address this problem and argue that natural disasters provide an ideal exogenous shock to examine big baths. Consistent with opportunistic reporting, we find that, relative to both matched firms unaffected by a natural disaster and matched firms affected by the same natural disaster that do not report large, negative special items, big bath firms experience greater improvements in post-disaster earnings for multiple years and higher future stock returns. We also find that CEOs of bath firms receive relatively larger increases in bonus and cash compensation in the years following the natural disaster. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers take advantage of the occurrence of natural disasters by engaging in opportunistic big bath reporting behavior.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
Do Firms Redact Information from Material Contracts to Conceal Bad News? Forecasting Shares Outstanding How Important Are Semi-Annual Earnings Announcements? An Information Event Perspective Tone at the Bottom: Measuring Corporate Misconduct Risk from the Text of Employee Reviews Hiding in Plain Sight: The Global Implications of Manager Disclosure
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1