{"title":"收购中的管理所有权和运营改进","authors":"John B. Cassel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3934568","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I examine the relationship between managerial ownership and operational performance for firms acquired in a buyout. I show that high post-buyout CEO ownership stakes are associated with improved firm profitability. This result is economically stronger for changes in ownership stakes, and is solely present when the CEO is retained. Ownership stakes are higher when initial profitability is low and is associated with cost cutting. Overall, the results support the view that improving managerial incentives is an important part of value creation in buyouts.","PeriodicalId":198413,"journal":{"name":"CGN: Private Equity Firms as Investors (Sub-Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Managerial Ownership and Operational Improvements in Buyouts\",\"authors\":\"John B. Cassel\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3934568\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I examine the relationship between managerial ownership and operational performance for firms acquired in a buyout. I show that high post-buyout CEO ownership stakes are associated with improved firm profitability. This result is economically stronger for changes in ownership stakes, and is solely present when the CEO is retained. Ownership stakes are higher when initial profitability is low and is associated with cost cutting. Overall, the results support the view that improving managerial incentives is an important part of value creation in buyouts.\",\"PeriodicalId\":198413,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CGN: Private Equity Firms as Investors (Sub-Topic)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CGN: Private Equity Firms as Investors (Sub-Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3934568\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CGN: Private Equity Firms as Investors (Sub-Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3934568","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Managerial Ownership and Operational Improvements in Buyouts
I examine the relationship between managerial ownership and operational performance for firms acquired in a buyout. I show that high post-buyout CEO ownership stakes are associated with improved firm profitability. This result is economically stronger for changes in ownership stakes, and is solely present when the CEO is retained. Ownership stakes are higher when initial profitability is low and is associated with cost cutting. Overall, the results support the view that improving managerial incentives is an important part of value creation in buyouts.