垂直结构

S. Acquaviva, M. Santuccio
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引用次数: 81

摘要

这些说明涵盖了与市场垂直结构有关的若干主题。我将首先回顾双重边缘化的问题,这种问题发生在沿垂直链相互销售的公司拥有市场力量的时候。你在15.010被介绍到双重边缘化;我在这里的目的是回顾这个概念,并讨论公司有时用来处理这个问题的策略(除了垂直整合)。接下来,我转向垄断价格歧视的做法。通常,中间投入的购买者具有垄断权力。行使垄断权力的最简单方法是减少购买量。(见Pindyck和Rubinfeld的《微观经济学》第10.5和10.6节,关于垄断权力的讨论。)然而,有时企业可以利用价格歧视作为利用其垄断力量的手段。我们将研究如何做到这一点,特别关注造纸公司购买木材的问题。然后,我将讨论当一家公司依赖下游分销商分销和销售其产品时出现的问题。例如软饮料的装瓶商和汽车的经销商。如果有的话,应该对下游分销商施加什么限制,以使上游制造商的利益最大化?最后,我将讨论特许经营,这是一种在许多服务相关行业中非常常见的垂直结构形式。我们将看到,特许经营是解决信息不对称和激励设计问题的有效途径。
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The Vertical Structure
These notes cover a number of topics related to the vertical structure of markets. I will begin by reviewing the problem of double marginalization, which occurs when firms selling to each other along a vertical chain have market power. You were introduced to double marginalization in 15.010; my objective here is to review the concept, and discuss strategies (besides vertical integration) that firms sometimes use to deal with the problem. Next, I turn to the practice of monopsonistic price discrimination. Often, buyers of intermediate inputs have monopsony power. The simplest way of exercising monopsony power is by reducing the quantity purchased. (See Sections 10.5 and 10.6 of Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, for a discussion of monopsony power.) However, sometimes firms can utilize price discrimination as a means of exploiting their monopsony power. We will see how this can be done, focusing in particular on the purchase of timber by paper companies. Then, I will discuss issues that arise when a firm depends on downstream distributers to distribute and sell its products. Examples are bottlers in the case of soft drinks, and dealerships in the case of automobiles. What restrictions, if any, should be imposed on downstream distributers to maximize the benefits to the upstream manufacturers? Lastly, I discuss franchising, a form of vertical structure that has become very common in many service-related industries. As we will see, franchising can be an effective way of dealing with problems of asymmetric information and incentive design.
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