Richard A. Cazier, Theodore E. Christensen, Kenneth J. Merkley, J. Treu
{"title":"诉讼风险与非公认会计准则报告的监管","authors":"Richard A. Cazier, Theodore E. Christensen, Kenneth J. Merkley, J. Treu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2928260","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The SEC has recently raised renewed concerns about firms’ reporting of adjusted (non-GAAP) earnings metrics. Regulators have significant interest in understanding the factors that help constrain non-GAAP reporting. We first provide evidence on the relation between securities litigation risk and firms’ propensity to report non-GAAP earnings. We then provide evidence on how this relation is moderated by the regulation of non-GAAP disclosure under Reg G. Using a plausibly exogenous litigation shock based on a U.S. circuit court ruling, we find a robust negative relation between litigation risk and non-GAAP reporting prior to the passage of Reg G. This negative relation suggests that, in the absence of rules-based regulation of non-GAAP reporting, litigation risk helps to constrain non-GAAP disclosure. However, our evidence suggests that the subsequent regulation of non-GAAP disclosure has decreased the sensitivity of non-GAAP disclosure to litigation risk. Specifically, we find that differences in non-GAAP reporting across judicial circuits are diminished and the negative association between litigation risk and non-GAAP reporting is significantly attenuated following the implementation of Reg G. Our results are consistent with claims that Reg G has had the unintended consequence of shielding firms’ non-GAAP disclosures from litigation risk by creating a de facto “safe harbor” for non-GAAP disclosure. Finally, we use our quasi-natural-experimental setting to validate a new proxy for circuit-specific litigation risk that future researchers can employ in any setting.","PeriodicalId":181062,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Disclosure","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"22","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Litigation Risk and the Regulation of Non-GAAP Reporting\",\"authors\":\"Richard A. Cazier, Theodore E. Christensen, Kenneth J. Merkley, J. Treu\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2928260\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The SEC has recently raised renewed concerns about firms’ reporting of adjusted (non-GAAP) earnings metrics. Regulators have significant interest in understanding the factors that help constrain non-GAAP reporting. We first provide evidence on the relation between securities litigation risk and firms’ propensity to report non-GAAP earnings. We then provide evidence on how this relation is moderated by the regulation of non-GAAP disclosure under Reg G. Using a plausibly exogenous litigation shock based on a U.S. circuit court ruling, we find a robust negative relation between litigation risk and non-GAAP reporting prior to the passage of Reg G. This negative relation suggests that, in the absence of rules-based regulation of non-GAAP reporting, litigation risk helps to constrain non-GAAP disclosure. However, our evidence suggests that the subsequent regulation of non-GAAP disclosure has decreased the sensitivity of non-GAAP disclosure to litigation risk. Specifically, we find that differences in non-GAAP reporting across judicial circuits are diminished and the negative association between litigation risk and non-GAAP reporting is significantly attenuated following the implementation of Reg G. Our results are consistent with claims that Reg G has had the unintended consequence of shielding firms’ non-GAAP disclosures from litigation risk by creating a de facto “safe harbor” for non-GAAP disclosure. Finally, we use our quasi-natural-experimental setting to validate a new proxy for circuit-specific litigation risk that future researchers can employ in any setting.\",\"PeriodicalId\":181062,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Governance: Disclosure\",\"volume\":\"22 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-02-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"22\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Governance: Disclosure\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2928260\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance: Disclosure","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2928260","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Litigation Risk and the Regulation of Non-GAAP Reporting
The SEC has recently raised renewed concerns about firms’ reporting of adjusted (non-GAAP) earnings metrics. Regulators have significant interest in understanding the factors that help constrain non-GAAP reporting. We first provide evidence on the relation between securities litigation risk and firms’ propensity to report non-GAAP earnings. We then provide evidence on how this relation is moderated by the regulation of non-GAAP disclosure under Reg G. Using a plausibly exogenous litigation shock based on a U.S. circuit court ruling, we find a robust negative relation between litigation risk and non-GAAP reporting prior to the passage of Reg G. This negative relation suggests that, in the absence of rules-based regulation of non-GAAP reporting, litigation risk helps to constrain non-GAAP disclosure. However, our evidence suggests that the subsequent regulation of non-GAAP disclosure has decreased the sensitivity of non-GAAP disclosure to litigation risk. Specifically, we find that differences in non-GAAP reporting across judicial circuits are diminished and the negative association between litigation risk and non-GAAP reporting is significantly attenuated following the implementation of Reg G. Our results are consistent with claims that Reg G has had the unintended consequence of shielding firms’ non-GAAP disclosures from litigation risk by creating a de facto “safe harbor” for non-GAAP disclosure. Finally, we use our quasi-natural-experimental setting to validate a new proxy for circuit-specific litigation risk that future researchers can employ in any setting.