基于指令集编码的防软件逆向工程的硬件保护

PPREW'14 Pub Date : 2014-01-22 DOI:10.1145/2556464.2556469
J. Danger, S. Guilley, Florian Praden
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引用次数: 10

摘要

软件程序容易进行逆向工程。保护通常包括混淆或随机指令集仿真(RISE)。在本文中,我们将探索一种适用于嵌入式系统的混合软件/硬件RISE。这种解决方案非常容易在任何开放CPU核心(LEON, openRISC, LatticeMicro32等)上实现,因为它只意味着在代码执行硬件的最新阶段进行局部更改,这使得达拉斯和DMA攻击不成功。类似地,软件开发流程中的变更是次要和直接的。总之,我们的研究表明,如果硬件和软件都是定制的,则可以在几乎没有开销的情况下获得简单的保护。
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Hardware-enforced Protection against Software Reverse-Engineering based on an Instruction Set Encoding
Software programs are prone to reverse-engineering. Protection usually consists either in obfuscation or Randomized Instruction Set Emulation (RISE). In this article, we explore a mixed software/hardware RISE suitable for embedded systems. This solution is very easy to implement on any open CPU core (LEON, openRISC, LatticeMicro32, etc.), as it implies only localized changes at the latest stage of the code execution hardware, which makes Dallas and DMA attacks unsuccessful. Similarly, alternations in the software development flow are minor and straightforward. All in one, our study shows that an easy protection can be attained at virtually no overhead cost if both the hardware and the software are customized.
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