{"title":"量子计算机可信执行环境","authors":"Theodoros Trochatos;Chuanqi Xu;Sanjay Deshpande;Yao Lu;Yongshan Ding;Jakub Szefer","doi":"10.1109/LCA.2023.3325852","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We present the first architecture for a trusted execution environment for quantum computers. In the architecture, to protect the user's circuits, they are obfuscated with decoy control pulses added during circuit transpilation by the user. The decoy pulses are removed, i.e. attenuated, by the trusted hardware inside the superconducting quantum computer's fridge before they reach the qubits. This preliminary work demonstrates that protection from possibly malicious cloud providers is feasible with minimal hardware cost.","PeriodicalId":51248,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Computer Architecture Letters","volume":"22 2","pages":"177-180"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Quantum Computer Trusted Execution Environment\",\"authors\":\"Theodoros Trochatos;Chuanqi Xu;Sanjay Deshpande;Yao Lu;Yongshan Ding;Jakub Szefer\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/LCA.2023.3325852\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We present the first architecture for a trusted execution environment for quantum computers. In the architecture, to protect the user's circuits, they are obfuscated with decoy control pulses added during circuit transpilation by the user. The decoy pulses are removed, i.e. attenuated, by the trusted hardware inside the superconducting quantum computer's fridge before they reach the qubits. This preliminary work demonstrates that protection from possibly malicious cloud providers is feasible with minimal hardware cost.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51248,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"IEEE Computer Architecture Letters\",\"volume\":\"22 2\",\"pages\":\"177-180\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"IEEE Computer Architecture Letters\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"94\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10288020/\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"计算机科学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Computer Architecture Letters","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10288020/","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE","Score":null,"Total":0}
We present the first architecture for a trusted execution environment for quantum computers. In the architecture, to protect the user's circuits, they are obfuscated with decoy control pulses added during circuit transpilation by the user. The decoy pulses are removed, i.e. attenuated, by the trusted hardware inside the superconducting quantum computer's fridge before they reach the qubits. This preliminary work demonstrates that protection from possibly malicious cloud providers is feasible with minimal hardware cost.
期刊介绍:
IEEE Computer Architecture Letters is a rigorously peer-reviewed forum for publishing early, high-impact results in the areas of uni- and multiprocessor computer systems, computer architecture, microarchitecture, workload characterization, performance evaluation and simulation techniques, and power-aware computing. Submissions are welcomed on any topic in computer architecture, especially but not limited to: microprocessor and multiprocessor systems, microarchitecture and ILP processors, workload characterization, performance evaluation and simulation techniques, compiler-hardware and operating system-hardware interactions, interconnect architectures, memory and cache systems, power and thermal issues at the architecture level, I/O architectures and techniques, independent validation of previously published results, analysis of unsuccessful techniques, domain-specific processor architectures (e.g., embedded, graphics, network, etc.), real-time and high-availability architectures, reconfigurable systems.