对权利概念的正确认识:透过义务棱镜的观点

M. K. Ustahaliloğlu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

导论:权利概念作为法学的基本概念之一,不能作为一个独立的概念而存在。它是法律义务概念的必要条件,使前者的存在和意义。这类似于炉子和火的概念之间的关系:尽管火可以在没有炉子的情况下存在并具有意义,但没有火,炉子的存在和意义都是不可能的。目的:本文旨在深入分析权利的概念,为法人人格持有主体提供利益,保护其免受其他主体可能带来的潜在危害。它要求通过对另一个人(至少与一个人直接或间接相关)施加法律义务(以执行或禁止执行某些法律行为的法律规定来表达)来保护利益(直接或间接与至少一个人相关)。结论:本研究得出的结论是,权利概念本身并不存在,而是在法律义务对其有利的情况下,从拥有法人人格的实体的角度出现的。
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THE RIGHT PERCEPTION OF THE CONCEPT OF RIGHT: A VIEW THROUGH THE PRISM OF OBLIGATIONS
Introduction: the concept of right, which is one of the fundamental concepts of legal science, cannot exist as an independent concept. It is sine qua non dependent on the concept of legal obligation that gives the former its existence and meaning. This is similar to the relationship between the concepts of stove and fire: even though fire can exist and have a meaning without a stove, neither the existence nor the meaning of a stove is possible without fire. Purpose: this article aims to thoroughly analyze the concept of right, instituted in order to provide benefits for legal personality-holding entities and protect them from potential harms that may come from other entities, which requires the protection of an interest (directly or indirectly related to at least one human being) by imposing a legal obligation (expressed either in a legal prescription to perform or in a prohibition against performing certain legal acts) on another being (directly or indirectly related to at least one human being). Conclusion: this study concludes that the concept of right does not exist in and of itself, but rather appears from the perspective of a legal personality-holding entity when a legal obligation has been established in its favor.
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