休谟和康德的学术怀疑主义:卡塔琳娜·塞塞罗式的形而上学批判González金特罗(书评)

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Hume Studies Pub Date : 2023-11-01 DOI:10.1353/hms.2023.a910752
Zuzana Parusniková
{"title":"休谟和康德的学术怀疑主义:卡塔琳娜·塞塞罗式的形而上学批判González金特罗(书评)","authors":"Zuzana Parusniková","doi":"10.1353/hms.2023.a910752","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Reviewed by: Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics by Catalina González Quintero Zuzana Parusniková Catalina González Quintero. Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics. Cham: Springer, 2022. Pp. 268. Hardcover. ISBN: 978-3-030-89749-9. £99.99. This book is a valuable contribution to the rapidly expanding field of research into the formative impact of ancient skepticism on early modern philosophy. This new paradigm was introduced several decades ago, as González Quintero acknowledges, by the pioneering work of Richard Popkin; and while Popkin emphasized the constitutive role of Pyrrhonism in this process, recent philosophical debates have been characterized by a more measured approach, carefully differentiating between the Academics and the Pyrrhonists, and their respective influence on modern skeptics. Gonzáles Quintero opts for the Academic interpretation of Hume’s skepticism, applying it to both his Treatise and the first Enquiry, and extending it to both of Kant’s Critiques—an area much less explored in the context of ancient skepticism. She thus heads into a complex philosophical landscape. The reader may be somewhat puzzled by the book’s subtitle, one which seems to add yet another theme to its already broad structure. However, as Gonzáles Quintero explains in the Introduction, she wants to take the discussions of Academic skepticism beyond the field of empirical science and concentrate on the attitude of the skeptics towards metaphysics; her aim is to show how Cicero, Hume, and Kant “used skeptical means to examine the justification of metaphysical claims and to determine, in this way, which resulting beliefs could be held non-dogmatically and for practical purposes” (1). Perhaps then, the book may be more accurately titled Academic Skepticism and Metaphysics: Cicero, Hume and Kant. Though this may seem a reduction in the scope of the topics, in this particular case it is an expansion, since the author reconstructs how the attitude of the skeptics to metaphysics unfolds from their general epistemological skepticism concerning the limits of reason. She divides the book into three main parts (Cicero, Hume, and Kant), with the first chapter of each part describing the skeptical method of that particular philosopher or school, and the second examining its application to metaphysical matters. This is a huge undertaking for one book, requiring the author to navigate a vast field of philosophical material, including a significant amount of primary and secondary literature, while turning it all back toward the main question concerning the role played by Academic (Carneadean) skepticism in the ancient, Humean, and Kantian treatments of religion and other metaphysical issues. The danger of topic-overload arises and a selective approach is crucial to avoid “dropping the ball.” Gonzáles Quintero tackles this task with varying success. [End Page 346] The first chapter of the first part of the book provides a thorough analysis of Academic skepticism and how it differs from Pyrrhonism and stoicism. With an extensive knowledge of scholarly debates on ancient skepticism, the author discusses various nuances in the relationship between radical Pyrrhonism and Arciselaus of the Second Academy, moving on, predictably, to Carneades of the Third Academy, who proposed a moderate version of skepticism based on evaluating the degree of persuasiveness of impressions. Such impressions deserve non-dogmatic approval and can thus reduce the scope of epoché; they motivate our search for truth while admitting our fallibility; and they guide us in practical matters. Her argument that assenting to persuasive beliefs contains a rational (normative) aspect perhaps deserves further discussion; for the ancient skeptics the criterion of persuasiveness was subjective and unstable, reflecting our momentary feelings about appearances. In the chapter on metaphysics, the author compares Cicero’s skeptical method in De Natura Deorum (DND) and the Tusculan Disputations. In the former, Cicero (through the character of Cotta) abandons skeptical principles (which would prevent us from defining the nature of the gods) for the sake of the practical usefulness of religious rituals as endorsed by the Stoics; while for the Epicureans (Velleius) the gods (or some cosmic Deity) are utterly unconcerned by our world, for the Stoics (Balbus) they care about human affairs—thus this latter stance supports the state religion that Cicero...","PeriodicalId":29761,"journal":{"name":"Hume Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics by Catalina González Quintero (review)\",\"authors\":\"Zuzana Parusniková\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/hms.2023.a910752\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Reviewed by: Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics by Catalina González Quintero Zuzana Parusniková Catalina González Quintero. Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics. Cham: Springer, 2022. Pp. 268. Hardcover. ISBN: 978-3-030-89749-9. £99.99. This book is a valuable contribution to the rapidly expanding field of research into the formative impact of ancient skepticism on early modern philosophy. This new paradigm was introduced several decades ago, as González Quintero acknowledges, by the pioneering work of Richard Popkin; and while Popkin emphasized the constitutive role of Pyrrhonism in this process, recent philosophical debates have been characterized by a more measured approach, carefully differentiating between the Academics and the Pyrrhonists, and their respective influence on modern skeptics. Gonzáles Quintero opts for the Academic interpretation of Hume’s skepticism, applying it to both his Treatise and the first Enquiry, and extending it to both of Kant’s Critiques—an area much less explored in the context of ancient skepticism. She thus heads into a complex philosophical landscape. The reader may be somewhat puzzled by the book’s subtitle, one which seems to add yet another theme to its already broad structure. However, as Gonzáles Quintero explains in the Introduction, she wants to take the discussions of Academic skepticism beyond the field of empirical science and concentrate on the attitude of the skeptics towards metaphysics; her aim is to show how Cicero, Hume, and Kant “used skeptical means to examine the justification of metaphysical claims and to determine, in this way, which resulting beliefs could be held non-dogmatically and for practical purposes” (1). Perhaps then, the book may be more accurately titled Academic Skepticism and Metaphysics: Cicero, Hume and Kant. Though this may seem a reduction in the scope of the topics, in this particular case it is an expansion, since the author reconstructs how the attitude of the skeptics to metaphysics unfolds from their general epistemological skepticism concerning the limits of reason. She divides the book into three main parts (Cicero, Hume, and Kant), with the first chapter of each part describing the skeptical method of that particular philosopher or school, and the second examining its application to metaphysical matters. This is a huge undertaking for one book, requiring the author to navigate a vast field of philosophical material, including a significant amount of primary and secondary literature, while turning it all back toward the main question concerning the role played by Academic (Carneadean) skepticism in the ancient, Humean, and Kantian treatments of religion and other metaphysical issues. The danger of topic-overload arises and a selective approach is crucial to avoid “dropping the ball.” Gonzáles Quintero tackles this task with varying success. [End Page 346] The first chapter of the first part of the book provides a thorough analysis of Academic skepticism and how it differs from Pyrrhonism and stoicism. With an extensive knowledge of scholarly debates on ancient skepticism, the author discusses various nuances in the relationship between radical Pyrrhonism and Arciselaus of the Second Academy, moving on, predictably, to Carneades of the Third Academy, who proposed a moderate version of skepticism based on evaluating the degree of persuasiveness of impressions. Such impressions deserve non-dogmatic approval and can thus reduce the scope of epoché; they motivate our search for truth while admitting our fallibility; and they guide us in practical matters. Her argument that assenting to persuasive beliefs contains a rational (normative) aspect perhaps deserves further discussion; for the ancient skeptics the criterion of persuasiveness was subjective and unstable, reflecting our momentary feelings about appearances. In the chapter on metaphysics, the author compares Cicero’s skeptical method in De Natura Deorum (DND) and the Tusculan Disputations. In the former, Cicero (through the character of Cotta) abandons skeptical principles (which would prevent us from defining the nature of the gods) for the sake of the practical usefulness of religious rituals as endorsed by the Stoics; while for the Epicureans (Velleius) the gods (or some cosmic Deity) are utterly unconcerned by our world, for the Stoics (Balbus) they care about human affairs—thus this latter stance supports the state religion that Cicero...\",\"PeriodicalId\":29761,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Hume Studies\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Hume Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2023.a910752\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hume Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2023.a910752","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

评:休谟和康德的学术怀疑主义:卡塔琳娜·塞塞罗式的形而上学批判González金特罗祖扎娜·帕鲁斯尼科夫卡塔琳娜González金特罗。休谟和康德的学术怀疑主义:西塞罗式的形而上学批判。2020年,2022年。268页。精装书。ISBN: 978-3-030-89749-9。£99.99。这本书是一个宝贵的贡献,研究领域迅速扩大到古代怀疑主义对早期现代哲学的形成性影响。正如González金特罗承认的那样,这种新范式是在几十年前由理查德·波普金(Richard Popkin)的开创性工作引入的;虽然波普金强调皮洛斯主义在这一过程中的构成作用,但最近的哲学辩论以一种更慎重的方式为特征,仔细区分了学者和皮洛斯主义者,以及他们各自对现代怀疑论者的影响。Gonzáles金特罗选择了休谟怀疑论的学术解释,将其应用于他的《人学论》和《第一探究》,并将其扩展到康德的《批判》——这是一个在古代怀疑主义背景下很少探索的领域。因此,她进入了一个复杂的哲学景观。读者可能会对这本书的副标题感到有些困惑,副标题似乎是在其已经广泛的结构上又增加了一个主题。然而,正如Gonzáles金特罗在引言中所解释的那样,她想把对学术怀疑主义的讨论带出经验科学的领域,集中在怀疑论者对形而上学的态度上;她的目的是展示西塞罗、休谟和康德如何“使用怀疑的手段来检验形而上学主张的正当性,并以这种方式确定,由此产生的信念可以非教条地持有,并用于实际目的”(1)。也许,这本书的标题可能更准确:学术怀疑主义和形而上学:西塞罗、休谟和康德。虽然这似乎是主题范围的缩小,但在这种特殊情况下,它是一种扩展,因为作者重建了怀疑论者对形而上学的态度如何从他们关于理性极限的一般认识论怀疑主义中展开。她把这本书分成三个主要部分(西塞罗、休谟和康德),每个部分的第一章描述了特定哲学家或学派的怀疑方法,第二章研究了其在形而上学问题上的应用。对于一本书来说,这是一个巨大的任务,要求作者浏览广阔的哲学材料领域,包括大量的原始和次要文献,同时将其全部转向主要问题,即学术(卡尼阿德)怀疑主义在古代,休谟和康德对宗教和其他形而上学问题的处理中所起的作用。主题过载的危险出现了,有选择的方法对于避免“丢球”至关重要。Gonzáles金特罗处理这个任务取得了不同程度的成功。本书第一部分的第一章全面分析了学术怀疑主义及其与皮浪主义和斯多葛主义的区别。凭借对古代怀疑论学术辩论的广泛了解,作者讨论了激进的皮罗尼主义和第二学院的阿西塞劳斯之间关系的各种细微差别,可以预见的是,第三学院的卡尼阿德斯,他提出了一个基于评估印象说服力程度的温和版本的怀疑主义。这样的印象应该得到非教条主义的认可,从而可以缩小时代变革的范围;它们激励我们追求真理,同时承认我们的错误;他们在实际问题上指导我们。她认为赞同有说服力的信念包含理性(规范)方面的观点或许值得进一步讨论;对于古代的怀疑论者来说,说服力的标准是主观的、不稳定的,反映了我们对表象的短暂感受。在形而上学一章中,笔者比较了西塞罗在《自然论》和《图斯库兰论辩》中的怀疑论方法。在前者中,西塞罗(通过科塔的角色)放弃了怀疑的原则(这将阻止我们定义神的本质),因为宗教仪式的实际用途得到了斯多葛派的认可;对于伊壁鸠鲁派(维列略)来说,诸神(或宇宙之神)完全不关心我们的世界,而对于斯多葛派(巴尔布斯)来说,他们关心的是人类的事务——因此后者的立场支持了西塞罗……
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics by Catalina González Quintero (review)
Reviewed by: Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics by Catalina González Quintero Zuzana Parusniková Catalina González Quintero. Academic Skepticism in Hume and Kant: A Ciceronian Critique of Metaphysics. Cham: Springer, 2022. Pp. 268. Hardcover. ISBN: 978-3-030-89749-9. £99.99. This book is a valuable contribution to the rapidly expanding field of research into the formative impact of ancient skepticism on early modern philosophy. This new paradigm was introduced several decades ago, as González Quintero acknowledges, by the pioneering work of Richard Popkin; and while Popkin emphasized the constitutive role of Pyrrhonism in this process, recent philosophical debates have been characterized by a more measured approach, carefully differentiating between the Academics and the Pyrrhonists, and their respective influence on modern skeptics. Gonzáles Quintero opts for the Academic interpretation of Hume’s skepticism, applying it to both his Treatise and the first Enquiry, and extending it to both of Kant’s Critiques—an area much less explored in the context of ancient skepticism. She thus heads into a complex philosophical landscape. The reader may be somewhat puzzled by the book’s subtitle, one which seems to add yet another theme to its already broad structure. However, as Gonzáles Quintero explains in the Introduction, she wants to take the discussions of Academic skepticism beyond the field of empirical science and concentrate on the attitude of the skeptics towards metaphysics; her aim is to show how Cicero, Hume, and Kant “used skeptical means to examine the justification of metaphysical claims and to determine, in this way, which resulting beliefs could be held non-dogmatically and for practical purposes” (1). Perhaps then, the book may be more accurately titled Academic Skepticism and Metaphysics: Cicero, Hume and Kant. Though this may seem a reduction in the scope of the topics, in this particular case it is an expansion, since the author reconstructs how the attitude of the skeptics to metaphysics unfolds from their general epistemological skepticism concerning the limits of reason. She divides the book into three main parts (Cicero, Hume, and Kant), with the first chapter of each part describing the skeptical method of that particular philosopher or school, and the second examining its application to metaphysical matters. This is a huge undertaking for one book, requiring the author to navigate a vast field of philosophical material, including a significant amount of primary and secondary literature, while turning it all back toward the main question concerning the role played by Academic (Carneadean) skepticism in the ancient, Humean, and Kantian treatments of religion and other metaphysical issues. The danger of topic-overload arises and a selective approach is crucial to avoid “dropping the ball.” Gonzáles Quintero tackles this task with varying success. [End Page 346] The first chapter of the first part of the book provides a thorough analysis of Academic skepticism and how it differs from Pyrrhonism and stoicism. With an extensive knowledge of scholarly debates on ancient skepticism, the author discusses various nuances in the relationship between radical Pyrrhonism and Arciselaus of the Second Academy, moving on, predictably, to Carneades of the Third Academy, who proposed a moderate version of skepticism based on evaluating the degree of persuasiveness of impressions. Such impressions deserve non-dogmatic approval and can thus reduce the scope of epoché; they motivate our search for truth while admitting our fallibility; and they guide us in practical matters. Her argument that assenting to persuasive beliefs contains a rational (normative) aspect perhaps deserves further discussion; for the ancient skeptics the criterion of persuasiveness was subjective and unstable, reflecting our momentary feelings about appearances. In the chapter on metaphysics, the author compares Cicero’s skeptical method in De Natura Deorum (DND) and the Tusculan Disputations. In the former, Cicero (through the character of Cotta) abandons skeptical principles (which would prevent us from defining the nature of the gods) for the sake of the practical usefulness of religious rituals as endorsed by the Stoics; while for the Epicureans (Velleius) the gods (or some cosmic Deity) are utterly unconcerned by our world, for the Stoics (Balbus) they care about human affairs—thus this latter stance supports the state religion that Cicero...
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊最新文献
The Testimony of Sense: Empiricism and the Essay from Hume to Hazlitt by Tim Milnes (review) Hume as Regularity Theorist—After All! Completing a Counter-Revolution Hume on Self-Government and Strength of Mind Hume beyond Theism and Atheism Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment in Light of His Explanatory Project
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1