Integrating Governor Posts Into the Federal Bureaucratic Structure: Resignation and Post-Tenure Careers of Governors in Russia

AbstractAuthoritarian leaders incorporate key subnational posts into state bureaucratic structures to consolidate their regimes. Exploiting a comprehensive dataset of post-tenure careers of governors in Russia, this study demonstrates that under the centralisation reforms of the Putin presidency, governors have left their posts at the discretion of the federal government. In the 2010s, outgoing governors frequently faced criminal charges. At the same time, an increasing number of governors have been promoted to federal government posts, and regional posts have been incorporated into the federal administrative structure through a combination of tight control and promotions. AcknowledgementsThe author gratefully acknowledges the comments from Shuhei Mizoguchi, which substantially improved the original manuscript. The author also thanks the two reviewers appointed by Europe-Asia Studies for their helpful comments. This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science under Kakenhi grant number JP21J00191 and the K. Matsushita Foundation under Research grant number 19-G32.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For the sake of simplicity, I use the term ‘region’ to describe the subjects of the Russian Federation (sub”ekty Rossiiskoi Federatsii) and the term ‘governor’ to describe the executive heads of the subjects of the Russian Federation, whatever official titles they may have. Excluding regions illegally annexed from Ukraine, the subjects of the Russian Federation include republics (21), oblast’ (46), krai (nine), Autonomous Okrug (currently four, and six annexed to neighbour regions from 2005 to 2008), one Autonomous Oblast’ and two Cities of Federal Significance.2 After stopping ex-officio allocation of governors’ seats in 2002, the Federation Council has been filled with members loyal to the centre. Then, the Federation Council lost the political clout that it had acquired in the 1990s. See Ross and Turovsky (Citation2013, pp. 64–5).3 Initially, the number of the federal districts was seven. The North-Caucasus Federal District was separated from the Southern Federal District in 2010. These are not the subjects of the Russian Federation; rather, they are responsible for supervision of the activities of the regional governments. The number of regions assigned to the districts ranges from six to 18.4 Federal Law No. 159-FZ, ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal’nyi zakon ‘Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel’nykh (predstavitel’nykh) i ispolnitel’nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub’’ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ i v Federal’nyi zakon ‘Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel’nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Article 18, 11 November 2004. For the procedure of candidate recommendation, see, Decree No. 1603, ‘O poryadke rassmotreniya kandidatur na dolzhnost’ vysshego dolzhnostnogo litsa (rukovoditelya vysshego ispolnitel’nogo organa gosudarstvennogi vlasti) sub’’ekta Rosssiskoi Federatsii’, President of the Russian Federation, 27 December 2004.5 Author’s calculation based on the data provided by the website of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation, available at: http://cikrf.ru/eng/, accessed 10 January 2022.6 Remington et al. (Citation2022, p. 605) treat governors elected after 2012 as appointed governors due to the Kremlin’s tight control over their selection and removal. Hence, the following analysis considers governors elected in the reinstated gubernatorial elections as if they were appointed by the Kremlin.7 This group includes Sergei Shoigu (minister of defence since 2012), Sergei Lavrov (minister of foreign affairs since 2004) and El’vira Nabiullina (chair of the Bank of Russia since 2013).8 The governors of several autonomous okruga were included until the annexation of these okruga to neighbouring regions in the 2000s.9 I used the data of incumbent governors to demonstrate the shifts in pre-tenure careers. For reasons of comparability, these data were not included in the analysis of post-tenure careers.10 This number is lower than Flyagin’s dataset, which included post-tenure careers in 295 out of 323 cases. One of the reasons for this discrepancy is that my approach to dataset creation is more conservative than his. For instance, Flyagin writes that the ex-governor of Zabaikal Krai, Natal’ya Zhdanova, was transferred to the post of adviser in the Ministry of the North Caucasian Affairs (Flyagin Citation2021, p. 122). However, a ministry staff member contacted by the author of a news article denied such a transfer. See, ‘Eks-gubernator Zabaikal’ya konsul’tiruet Minkavkaz na ovshchestvennykh nachalakh’, TASS, 10 January 2019, available at: https://tass.ru/politika/5986698, accessed 8 June 2022. I could not find any article in the Integrum database that confirmed Zhdanova’s transfer. Additionally, I considered cases where a governor was said to have simply retired (vykhod na pensiyu) as ‘No data’ since several retired governors obtained certain posts even after announcement of ‘vykhod na pensiyu’. This expression is used for cases in which an old governor resigned and their ensuing post is yet to be publicly announced.11 Decree No. 75, ‘O nekotorykh voprosakh deyatel’nosti organov ispolnitel’noi vlasti v RSFSR’, President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, 22 August 1991.12 From 1991 to 1996, there were no replacements for governors in ethnic republics. The first case was the defeat of an incumbent governor of Marii-El, Vladislav Zotin, in January 1997. Moreover, two governors were promoted out of their posts and into federal government.13 Decree No. 951, ‘O vyborakh v organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i v organy mestnogo samoupravleniya’, President of the Russian Federation, Article 3, 17 September 1995. Several regions held gubernatorial elections before 1995.14 Federal Law No. 184-FZ, ‘Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel’nykh (predstavitel’nykh) i ispolnitel’nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Article 19.1, 6 October 1999. For the text, see Rossiiskaya gazeta, 19 October 1999, available at: https://rg.ru/1999/10/19/fz-284-dok.html, accessed 20 September 2021. The details of procedures and requirements are prescribed by the regional laws.15 Federal Law No. 106-FZ, ‘O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Federal’nyi Zakon “Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel’nykh (predstavitel’nykh) i ispolnitel’nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii”’, Article 1, 29 July 2000.16 In the case of Evgenii Nazdratenko, governor of Primorskii Krai between 1993 and 2001, a news article discussed the possibility of applying this rule to remove him, pointing out the difficulty in meeting the legal requirements (Chernyshev & Bulavinov Citation2001).17 Federal Law No. 159-FZ, ‘O vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Federal’nyi Zakon “Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel’nykh (predstavitel’nykh) i ispolnitel’nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” i v Federal’nyi Zakon “Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel’nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii”’, Article 1, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 15 December 2004, available at: https://rg.ru/2004/12/15/gubernatory-dok.html, accessed 20 September 2021.18 The decree explains the reason of his dismissal as the disruption of fuel delivery to a few counties (raiony). Decree No. 272, ‘O Loginove V. A.’, President of Russian Federation, 9 March 2005, available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/22122, accessed 4 June 2022.19 ‘Putin uvolil Furgala iz-za “utraty doveriya”. No pri chem zdes’ ego doverie? Furgala zhe vybirali grazhdane’, Meduza, 21 July 2020, available at: https://meduza.io/cards/putin-uvolil-furgala-iz-za-utraty-doveriya-no-pri-chem-zdes-ego-doverie-furgala-zhe-vybirali-grazhdane, accessed 18 September 2021.20 A lot of benefits have been supplied to retired governors. In Penza Oblast’, for instance, benefits for retired governors include personal use of official vehicles and an annual lump sum allowance for spa treatments. ‘Kakie gubernatorskie l’goty deistvuyut v rossiiskikh regionakh’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 9 November 2015, available at: https://rg.ru/2015/11/09/lgoti.html, accessed 5 July 2023.21 ‘Mikhail Ignat’ev poprosil vernut’ doverie: Byvshii glava Chuvashii trebuet priznat’ ukaz o sobstvennom uvol’nenii nezakonnym’, Kommersant’’, 27 May 2020, available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4357680, accessed 20 September 2021.22 The total number is 327, since Aleksandr Khloponin was appointed deputy prime minister and presidential envoy to the North Caucasian Federal District simultaneously.23 Just before the resignation, for instance, the governor of Bashkortostan, Murtaza Rakhimov, met the head of the Presidential Administration, Sergei Naryshkin. The goal of this meeting was to discuss ‘bloodless resignation’, to ensure that any conflict between the federal and regional governments was not made public. Shortly after the meeting, Rakhimov resigned voluntarily. ‘Na kogo nas otstavil: Kak ukhodil Murtaza Rakhimov’, Gazeta.ru, 15 July 2010, available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2010/07/15_a_3398345.shtml, accessed 28 September 2021.24 Although Goode (Citation2007, pp. 373–80) focuses on the success of these interventions, Reisinger and Moraski (Citation2017, ch. 4) and Golosov (Citation2011) point out the limited effectiveness of these tactics.25 In 2004, when federal elites debated abolition of popular gubernatorial elections, a governor suggested the appointment of mayors by governors, saying ‘governors already de facto appoint mayors, but they have virtually no means to remove them “except to wait for the next elections”’ (Goode Citation2007, p. 373). This seems to imply that the ability of higher-level elites to remove lower-level elites matters more in this system than the ability of the former to appoint their favourites.26 Since Yurii Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow from 1992 to 2010, refused to resign voluntarily in 2010, President Dmitrii Medvedev issued a decree to the effect that Luzhkov would leave early due to the loss of the president’s confidence. ‘Utrata doveriya v assortimente’, Vedomosti, 31 January 2020, available at: https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2020/01/31/821889-utrata-doveriya, accessed 23 September 2021.27 Federal Law No. 157-FZ, ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v Federal’nyi zakon “O politicheskikh partiyakh” i Federal’nyi zakon “Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratel’nykh prav i prava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii”’, Article 2, 2 October 2012. For the text, see Rossiiskaya gazeta, 5 October 2012, available at: https://rg.ru/2012/10/05/partii-dok.html, accessed 29 September 2021.28 The last instance of governors leaving their posts at the end of their terms was recorded in January 2017. These ten governors had resigned by June, and acting governors were promptly appointed to prepare for the gubernatorial elections scheduled in September.29 For instance, Evgenii Kuivashev, governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast’ since 2012, repeatedly declared that his decision to participate in the gubernatorial election of September 2022 would be made after meeting with Putin. ‘Evgenii Kuivashev podozhdet do maya’, Kommersant’’, 21 April 2022, available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5318413, accessed 6 May 2022. In May 2022, as Putin finally confirmed his participation in the election, Kuivashev won the gubernatorial race with more than 60% of the votes (‘Putin razreshil eks-glava Tyumeni Kuivashevu ne menyat’ rabotu’, 72.ru, 20 May 2022, available at: https://72.ru/text/politics/2022/05/20/71347712/, accessed 26 June 2023).30 Federal Law No. 184-FZ, ‘Ob obshchikh printsipakh organizatsii zakonodatel’nykh (pred- stavitel’nykh) i ispolnitel’nykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub”ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Article 18.5, 6 October 1999. For the text, see Rossiiskaya gazeta, 19 October 1999, available at https://rg.ru/1999/10/19/fz-284-dok.html, accessed 20 September 2021.31 For details, see ‘Kak menyalis’ zakonodatel’nye osnovy vyborov glav sub”ektov Rossii’, TASS, 27 September 2021, available at: https://tass.ru/info/12514329, accessed 29 September 2021.32 ‘Gubernatoram v Rossii mogut razreshit’ isbirat’sya bolee dvukh srokov podryad’, Deutsche Welle, 9 December 2021, available at: https://www.dw.com/ru/gosduma-prinjala-vo-vtorom-chtenii-zakonoproekt-razreshajushhij-bolee-dvuh-gubernatorskih-srokov/a-60074650, accessed 4 June 2022.33 ‘V Gosdumu vnesli zakonoproekt, razreshayushii glavam regionov izbirat’sya bolee dvukh srokov podryad. On pozvolit snova ballotirovat’sya Minnikhanovu i Sobyaninu’, Meduza, 27 September 2021, available at: https://meduza.io/news/2021/09/27/v-gosdumu-vnesli-zakonoproekt-razreshayuschiy-glavam-regionov-izbiratsya-bolee-dvuh-srokov-podryad-on-pozvolit-snov, accessed 29 September 2021.34 Since values in the table include incumbent governors, the total number of governors differs from the other tables pertaining to post-tenure careers.35 Honorary retirement indicates ‘appointments to positions of high prestige but without any real executive responsibilities’ (Remington et al. Citation2022, p. 606).36 ‘Important posts’ in this section refer to ministers and their deputies and heads of Presidential Administration and their deputies.37 ‘Gubernator bezhal, no reshil vernut’sya’, Gazeta.ru, 4 July 2003, available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/parliament/articles/38213.shtml, accessed 23 September 2021.38 A news article published in 1997 also confirms that Tuleev evaluated Yel’tsin’s decision as a ‘sensible approach’ (zdravyi podkhod). ‘Uvolen Kislyuk, naznachen Tuleev: Boris El’tsin “ubil” dvukh kemerovskikh “zaitsev”’, Kommersant’’, 2 July 1997, available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/180348, accessed 20 September 2021.39 ‘Sud’ba gubernatora Nazdratenko reshena Prezident pozvolit emu izbrat’sya na tretii srok’, Kommersant’’, 6 February 2001, available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/167429, accessed 25 September 2021.40 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.41 After his defeat in the gubernatorial election of Pskov Oblast’ in December 1996, he served as the first deputy minister of nationalities and federal relations from 1996 to 2000 (the name of the ministry changed a few times). He was appointed as the first deputy presidential envoy of the Ural Federal District in 2000. Since 2006, he has occupied several judicial posts.42 The governor of Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Valerii Potapenko (2006–2009), was appointed chief federal inspector of the region.43 ‘Evgeniyu Nazdratenko nashli rybnoe mesto’, Kommersant’’, 7 February 2001, available at: https://www. kommersant.ru/doc/167536, accessed 22 September 2021.44 ‘Ssyl’nyi mira sego’, Kommersant’’, 23 June 2003, available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/390607, accessed 22 September 2021.45 Because the federal government was conducting countermeasures against terrorists in the North Caucasus around 2010, this was a critical federal-level policy position. On Khloponin’s ability as an effective crisis manager, see Petrov (Citation2010, pp. 297–98); on Khloponin’s influence as the presidential envoy, see Ibragimov and Matsuzato (Citation2014).46 Khloponin, the governor of Krasnoyarsk Krai from 2002 to 2010, transferred to the post of presidential envoy to the North Caucasian Federal District. Menyailo served as the governor of Sevastopol’ City (2014–2016) and was appointed presidential envoy to the Siberian Federal District. Krasnoyarsk Krai is in the Siberian Federal District, and Sevastopol’ City falls under the jurisdiction of the Southern Federal District.47 For Viktor Tolokonskii’s transfer from the governorship of Novosibirsk Oblast’ to the post of presidential envoy to the Siberian Federal District in 2010, see ‘Svyazano li naznachenie Viktora Tolokonskogo polnomochnym predstavitelem prezidenta RF v SFO c predstoyashimi prezidentskimi vyborami v 2012 godu?’, Kontinent Sibir, 29 July–5 August 2010.48 ‘Tkachev ob”yasnil vozvrashchenie v Krasnodarskii krai’, Vedomosti, 30 July 2018, available at: https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2018/07/30/776923-tkachev, accessed 16 September 2021.49 On the history of the reform of the Federation Council, see ‘Sovet Federatsii: neskonchaemnaya reforma verkhnei palaty’, RBK, 26 November 2012, available at: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/26/11/2012/570400279a7947fcbd442e7f, accessed 28 May 2022. Before 2001, only Yurii Lodkin, former governor of Bryansk Region, had become a member of the Federation Council, after his governorship ended as a result of the 1993 elections.50 ‘Eksperty isuchali kar’ery 100 byvshikh gubernatorov: chashche vsego oni stanovit’sya senatorom v ramkakh “modeli tranzita”’, RBK, 26 March 2019, available at: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/26/03/2019/5c98bedb9a7947588db6c406, accessed 4 June 2022.51 For detailed information about these cases, see ‘Ugolovnye dela protiv gubernatorov i eks-gubernatorov v Rossii’, RIA Novosti, 9 February 2018, available at: https://ria.ru/20180209/1514277214.html, accessed 17 September 2021; ‘Chem zakanchivalis’ ugolovnye dela protiv gubernatorov: Istoriya voprosa’, Kommersant’’, 24 June 2016, available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3023134, accessed 28 October 2021.52 ‘General sdalsya bez edinogo putcha: Vybory kurskogo gubernatora proshli bez gubernatora’, Kommersant’’, 24 October 2000, available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/161386, accessed 27 October 2021.53 ‘V period “ottepeli” Medvedeva posazheny v tyur’mu vce oppozitsionnyi mery’, Ekho Moskvy, 22 September 2011, available at: https://echo.msk.ru/blog/tulsky/814248-echo/, accessed 28 August 2020.54 While testing the relationship between the regional siloviki rotations and criminal charges against governors, Andrei Yakovlev and Anton Aisin do not find this relationship to be statistically significant (Yakovlev & Aisin Citation2019, p. 537).55 ‘Na dolzhnost’ prem’era Dagestana vydvinuli ministra ekonomiki Tatarstana’, RBK, 6 February 2018, available at: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/06/02/2018/5a79750f9a79473ebcc255b5, accessed 22 September 2021.56 ‘“General-gubernator” Urala: kto takoi Vladimir Yakushev i pochemu ego naznachenie polpredom v UrFO stanet bol’shim sobytiem’, Znak, 6 November 2020, available at: https://www.znak.com/2020-11-06/kto_takoy_vladimir_yakushev_i_pochemu_ego_naznachenie_polpredom_v_urfo_stanet_revolyucionnym, accessed 29 September 2021.Additional informationNotes on contributorsMasatomo TorikaiMasatomo Torikai, Associate Professor, Graduate School for Law and Politics, Osaka University, 1–6, Machikaneyamacho, Toyonaka-shi, Osaka, Japan. Email: torikaim.law@osaka-u.ac.jp