岸电利用与推广补贴策略设计

IF 3.7 3区 工程技术 Q2 TRANSPORTATION Maritime Policy & Management Pub Date : 2023-10-08 DOI:10.1080/03088839.2023.2263010
Lu Zhen, Yingying Yuan, Dan Zhuge, Harilaos N. Psaraftis, Shuaian Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要岸电是港口减少碳排放的重要绿色技术。本文研究了如何设计补贴策略以促进岸电的安装和利用。然而,安装补贴可能会促进港口安装SPI,从而减少船舶排放量,而使用补贴可能会吸引更多的船舶访问,从而增加港口的总排放量。因此,应优化岸电利用和安装补贴,使政府成本(包括船舶排放的环境成本、利用或安装补贴成本和碳税)最小化,使港口利润(包括原船和新船利润、利用和安装补贴和碳税)最大化。运用Stackelberg博弈方法,对不补贴、港口承担spi -利用补贴、港口与政府承担spi -利用补贴、考虑spi -利用补贴的碳排放税政策、港口与政府承担spi -利用补贴和spi -安装补贴五种不同补贴政策的设计进行了综合分析。根据理论分析和数值实验结果得出管理见解,可以为政府和港口运营商提供参考。关键词:绿色港口电力补贴设计碳税stackelberg模型披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。本研究得到国家自然科学基金项目[资助号:71831008,72201163,72025103,72361137001,72071173]和香港特别行政区研究资助局[项目号:HKSAR RGC TRS T32-707/22-N]的支持。
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Subsidy strategy design for shore power utilization and promotion
ABSTRACTShore power is an important green technology used by ports to reduce carbon emissions. This paper investigates how to design subsidy strategy for promoting the installation and utilization of shore power. However, while installation subsidies may promote the installation of SPI in ports, resulting in a reduction in ship emissions, utilization subsidies may attract more ship visits, which may increase the total emissions of a port. Therefore, subsidies for shore power utilization and installation should be optimized to minimize the cost to government (comprising the environmental costs of ship emissions, the cost of utilization or installation subsidies, and carbon taxes) and maximize the profit for ports (including profit from original and new ships, utilization and installation subsidies, and carbon taxes). Using the Stackelberg game methodology, we discuss five cases to give a comprehensive analysis of the design of different subsidy policies, including no subsidy, SPI-utilization subsidy undertaken by port, SPI-utilization subsidy undertaken by port and government, carbon emission tax policy considering SPI-utilization subsidy, and SPI-utilization and SPI-installation subsidies undertaken by port and government. Managerial insights are generated according to the theoretical analysis and numerical experiments results, which can give references to the government and port operators.KEYWORDS: Green portsshore powersubsidy designcarbon taxStackelberg model Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant No. 71831008, 72201163, 72025103, 72361137001, 72071173], and the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China [Project number HKSAR RGC TRS T32-707/22-N].
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来源期刊
CiteScore
8.20
自引率
8.60%
发文量
66
期刊介绍: Thirty years ago maritime management decisions were taken on the basis of experience and hunch. Today, the experience is augmented by expert analysis and informed by research findings. Maritime Policy & Management provides the latest findings and analyses, and the opportunity for exchanging views through its Comment Section. A multi-disciplinary and international refereed journal, it brings together papers on the different topics that concern the maritime industry. Emphasis is placed on business, organizational, economic, sociolegal and management topics at port, community, shipping company and shipboard levels. The Journal also provides details of conferences and book reviews.
期刊最新文献
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