战略自动化和决策权

IF 1.2 4区 管理学 Q3 ECONOMICS Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI:10.1111/jems.12557
Mustafa Dogan, Alexandre Jacquillat, Pinar Yildirim
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了自动化对组织决策结构的影响。我们开发了一个公司的理论模型,其中,当部门由一位持有该部门特定私人信息的经理领导,并且与负责人的偏好不一致时,负责人会决定新产品开发部门的优先级。委托人选择是否将决策权下放给管理者,从而产生更明智但更公正的决策。在这种情况下,我们研究减少操作可变性的自动化如何改变组织结构的选择。我们的分析结果表明,企业根据其组织结构的不同,会以不同的方式部署自动化资源:集中式企业选择自动化面临更多不确定性的部门,而分散式企业则相反。此外,越来越多的自动化导致企业决策的高度集中。在扩展中,我们证明了自动化的战略性使用降低了企业内部沟通的信息性,并且自动化可以成为货币契约的战略替代品。
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Strategic automation and decision-making authority

This paper studies how automation impacts the structure of decision-making in organizations. We develop a theoretical model of a firm, where a principal makes a decision about how much to prioritize the new product development division when the division is led by a manager who holds private information specific to this division and has misaligned preferences with the principal. The principal chooses whether to decentralize this decision by delegating it to the manager, resulting in more informed but unbiased decision. In this setting, we investigate how automation which reduces operational variability may alter this choice of organizational structure. The findings from our analysis show that firms deploy automation resources differently depending on their organizational structure: centralized firms choose to automate divisions that face more uncertainty, while decentralized firms do the opposite. Moreover, increasing access to automation results in higher centralization of decision-making in firms. In the extensions, we show that the strategic use of automation reduces the informativeness of intrafirm communication, and also, that automation can be a strategic substitute to monetary contracts.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
5.30%
发文量
43
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