归咎:德国政党如何利用合作联邦制

IF 4.5 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE West European Politics Pub Date : 2023-11-09 DOI:10.1080/01402382.2023.2274719
Antonios Souris, Sabine Kropp, Christoph Nguyen
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The study demonstrates that parties, especially when they are involved in intergovernmental bodies and coalition governments, resort to ‘softer’ forms of blaming. The vertical integration of the party system also creates an effective blame barrier, containing self-serving strategies even during the prolonged crisis and several election campaigns.Keywords: Cooperative federalismblame attributionparty competitionparliamentary debatesCovid-19 AcknowledgementsWe thank the two reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments on earlier versions of this article and Akseli Paillette-Liettilä, Jonathan Röders, Polina Khubbeeva, Yannis Wittig, and Marek Wessels for their valuable research assistance.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The dataset, codebook, and further project documentation are available at the data repositorium of GESIS: https://doi.org/10.7802/2627.2 The existing literature uses both the term ‘blame attribution’ and the term ‘responsibility attribution’. While the literature on voters and their perceptions of multilevel systems generally uses the term ‘responsibility’, the more institutionally oriented contributions focus on the term ‘blame’. However, federalism research usually means by the term ‘responsibility’ the legal or constitutional competences of federal entities in federal systems. Therefore, we prefer to use the term ‘blame’ to delineate formal responsibilities from discursive ascriptions.3 Infection Protection Act of 20 July 2000 (BGBl. I: 1045), last amended by Article 8b of the Act of 20 December 2022 (BGBl. I: 2793).4 It was not possible to analyse all parliamentary debates on Covid-19. Based on the protocols of the plenary sessions in the Bundestag and the 16 Landtage, we initially marked all procedures related to managing Covid-19 that were debated there between 1 February 2020 and the federal elections on 26 September 2021. In total, we have identified 3117 procedures in this period.5 Regular discussions as well as the joint specification of definitions and coding instructions ensured a common understanding among the team members on how to code the debates. The Landtage were coded by five coders. Each coder reviewed his or her coded statements after some time and suggested changes to the original coding. This affected about 6% of the cases. These changes were discussed by the team and implemented accordingly. To ensure inter-coder reliability, every tenth debate (total: 21 debates) was again coded by a second coder. The second coder agreed with 78% of the originally coded strategies. Finally, each statement was checked by (at least) a second coder: 8% of the cases were adapted or deleted. The 10 debates in the Bundestag were coded by two coders. Initially, they coded five debates each. They then swapped debates and coded again the other five debates. The results were compared, differences were discussed, and the coding finalised. A third team member eventually checked all coded text sections: 6% of the cases were re-coded or deleted.6 In Germany, parliamentary party groups determine the deputies who take the floor for them in the debates (Müller et al. Citation2021: 381). Therefore, we can assign the deputies, speaking in the debates, to their respective party. Moreover, we treat the government representatives in the debates as speakers for their parties. This has been decided in the awareness that due to the different roles, the statements of the deputies can be more competitive and polarised than the ones of government representatives.7 Since the CDU and CSU do not compete at either level of government, and it is not clear whether the speakers in the Bundestag represent only the CDU, CSU, or both due to their joint parliamentary party group, we have decided to consider them together here. Empirically, the CSU is also not an outlier vis-a-vis comparable party branches of the CDU. The CDU’s Länder branches with governing responsibility exhibit 53% for ‘passing responsibility’ and 47% for ‘finding a scapegoat’. Including the CSU, the numbers slightly change to 52% and 48%.8 To determine the exact time periods of the three Covid-19 waves, we refer to the official information of the Robert Koch-Institute (RKI) (Tolksdorf et al. Citation2021). The RKI is the federal government’s institute for surveillance and prevention of infectious diseases and pandemic preparedness. The first wave lasted from 02 March 2020 to 17 May 2020, the second wave from 28 September 2020 to 28 January 2021, and the third wave from 01 February 2021 to 13 June 2021.9 When parties refer to a specific Land or Länder, we had to decide how to determine their party affiliation because they are usually governed by a coalition. We use the party affiliation of the respective minister president as distinction. As they represented the Länder in the meetings of the MPK with the chancellor, the minister presidents played the key role in federal crisis management and especially in the media reporting about it. Therefore, citizens primarily associated the Länder with their minister presidents.10 The five Länder were Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatine, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and Berlin. The elections in Thuringia were postponed to 2024 as the necessary two-thirds majority for the dissolution of the state parliament (Art. 50, 2; Constitution of Thuringia) could not be achieved.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by Volkswagen Foundation as part of the project ‘Political cohesion under conditions of fiscal scarcity – German federalism in the time of COVID-19 ‘[project number 2021000121] and by the Berlin University Alliance as part of the project ‘The Laws of Social Cohesion (LSC)’.Notes on contributorsAntonios SourisAntonios Souris is Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of German Politics at Freie Universität Berlin. In his dissertation, he investigated EU policy coordination in Germany’s federal system. His research focuses on comparative federalism, parliaments, and the policy areas of transport and housing. [antonios.souris@fu-berlin.de]Sabine KroppSabine Kropp is Professor of German Politics at Freie Universität Berlin. Her primary field of research is comparative federalism and multilevel politics, parliamentarism and public administration, with an emphasis on Germany and post-Soviet countries. Her recent book Emerging Federal Structures in the Post-Cold War Era (co-edited with Soeren Keil, Palgrave Macmillan 2022) investigates emerging and regressing federal structures in unconsolidated federal systems. [sabine.kropp@fu-berlin.de]Christoph NguyenChristoph Nguyen is Lecturer at the Chair of German Politics at Freie Universität Berlin. He received his PhD from Northwestern University. His research focuses on the intersection between affect, ideas, and politics and the use of quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-methods in political science. [christoph.nguyen@fu-berlin.de]","PeriodicalId":48213,"journal":{"name":"West European Politics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Attributing blame: how political parties in Germany leverage cooperative federalism\",\"authors\":\"Antonios Souris, Sabine Kropp, Christoph Nguyen\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/01402382.2023.2274719\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"AbstractThis study investigates how political parties used the federal structure of government for discursive blame attribution strategies in parliamentary debates during the Covid-19 crisis. The analysis focuses on the German case which is considered an embodiment of cooperative federalism. Largely intertwined responsibilities and joint decision making provide incentives for self-serving blame attribution strategies. The empirical investigation includes a qualitative content analysis of 212 parliamentary debates in the Bundestag and the 16 state parliaments. Overall, 2067 statements were manually coded and integrated into a novel dataset. The data reveal a more diverse discursive toolkit of blame attribution strategies than commonly conceptualised. The study demonstrates that parties, especially when they are involved in intergovernmental bodies and coalition governments, resort to ‘softer’ forms of blaming. The vertical integration of the party system also creates an effective blame barrier, containing self-serving strategies even during the prolonged crisis and several election campaigns.Keywords: Cooperative federalismblame attributionparty competitionparliamentary debatesCovid-19 AcknowledgementsWe thank the two reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments on earlier versions of this article and Akseli Paillette-Liettilä, Jonathan Röders, Polina Khubbeeva, Yannis Wittig, and Marek Wessels for their valuable research assistance.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The dataset, codebook, and further project documentation are available at the data repositorium of GESIS: https://doi.org/10.7802/2627.2 The existing literature uses both the term ‘blame attribution’ and the term ‘responsibility attribution’. While the literature on voters and their perceptions of multilevel systems generally uses the term ‘responsibility’, the more institutionally oriented contributions focus on the term ‘blame’. However, federalism research usually means by the term ‘responsibility’ the legal or constitutional competences of federal entities in federal systems. Therefore, we prefer to use the term ‘blame’ to delineate formal responsibilities from discursive ascriptions.3 Infection Protection Act of 20 July 2000 (BGBl. I: 1045), last amended by Article 8b of the Act of 20 December 2022 (BGBl. I: 2793).4 It was not possible to analyse all parliamentary debates on Covid-19. Based on the protocols of the plenary sessions in the Bundestag and the 16 Landtage, we initially marked all procedures related to managing Covid-19 that were debated there between 1 February 2020 and the federal elections on 26 September 2021. In total, we have identified 3117 procedures in this period.5 Regular discussions as well as the joint specification of definitions and coding instructions ensured a common understanding among the team members on how to code the debates. The Landtage were coded by five coders. Each coder reviewed his or her coded statements after some time and suggested changes to the original coding. This affected about 6% of the cases. These changes were discussed by the team and implemented accordingly. To ensure inter-coder reliability, every tenth debate (total: 21 debates) was again coded by a second coder. The second coder agreed with 78% of the originally coded strategies. Finally, each statement was checked by (at least) a second coder: 8% of the cases were adapted or deleted. The 10 debates in the Bundestag were coded by two coders. Initially, they coded five debates each. They then swapped debates and coded again the other five debates. The results were compared, differences were discussed, and the coding finalised. A third team member eventually checked all coded text sections: 6% of the cases were re-coded or deleted.6 In Germany, parliamentary party groups determine the deputies who take the floor for them in the debates (Müller et al. Citation2021: 381). Therefore, we can assign the deputies, speaking in the debates, to their respective party. Moreover, we treat the government representatives in the debates as speakers for their parties. This has been decided in the awareness that due to the different roles, the statements of the deputies can be more competitive and polarised than the ones of government representatives.7 Since the CDU and CSU do not compete at either level of government, and it is not clear whether the speakers in the Bundestag represent only the CDU, CSU, or both due to their joint parliamentary party group, we have decided to consider them together here. Empirically, the CSU is also not an outlier vis-a-vis comparable party branches of the CDU. The CDU’s Länder branches with governing responsibility exhibit 53% for ‘passing responsibility’ and 47% for ‘finding a scapegoat’. Including the CSU, the numbers slightly change to 52% and 48%.8 To determine the exact time periods of the three Covid-19 waves, we refer to the official information of the Robert Koch-Institute (RKI) (Tolksdorf et al. Citation2021). The RKI is the federal government’s institute for surveillance and prevention of infectious diseases and pandemic preparedness. The first wave lasted from 02 March 2020 to 17 May 2020, the second wave from 28 September 2020 to 28 January 2021, and the third wave from 01 February 2021 to 13 June 2021.9 When parties refer to a specific Land or Länder, we had to decide how to determine their party affiliation because they are usually governed by a coalition. We use the party affiliation of the respective minister president as distinction. As they represented the Länder in the meetings of the MPK with the chancellor, the minister presidents played the key role in federal crisis management and especially in the media reporting about it. Therefore, citizens primarily associated the Länder with their minister presidents.10 The five Länder were Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatine, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and Berlin. The elections in Thuringia were postponed to 2024 as the necessary two-thirds majority for the dissolution of the state parliament (Art. 50, 2; Constitution of Thuringia) could not be achieved.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by Volkswagen Foundation as part of the project ‘Political cohesion under conditions of fiscal scarcity – German federalism in the time of COVID-19 ‘[project number 2021000121] and by the Berlin University Alliance as part of the project ‘The Laws of Social Cohesion (LSC)’.Notes on contributorsAntonios SourisAntonios Souris is Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of German Politics at Freie Universität Berlin. In his dissertation, he investigated EU policy coordination in Germany’s federal system. His research focuses on comparative federalism, parliaments, and the policy areas of transport and housing. [antonios.souris@fu-berlin.de]Sabine KroppSabine Kropp is Professor of German Politics at Freie Universität Berlin. Her primary field of research is comparative federalism and multilevel politics, parliamentarism and public administration, with an emphasis on Germany and post-Soviet countries. Her recent book Emerging Federal Structures in the Post-Cold War Era (co-edited with Soeren Keil, Palgrave Macmillan 2022) investigates emerging and regressing federal structures in unconsolidated federal systems. [sabine.kropp@fu-berlin.de]Christoph NguyenChristoph Nguyen is Lecturer at the Chair of German Politics at Freie Universität Berlin. He received his PhD from Northwestern University. His research focuses on the intersection between affect, ideas, and politics and the use of quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-methods in political science. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本研究探讨了在2019冠状病毒病危机期间,政党如何在议会辩论中使用联邦政府结构进行话语指责归因策略。分析的重点是被认为是合作联邦制体现的德国案例。很大程度上相互交织的责任和共同决策为自私的归因策略提供了激励。实证调查包括对联邦议院和16个州议会的212次议会辩论进行定性内容分析。总的来说,2067条语句被手工编码并集成到一个新的数据集中。数据揭示了一个更多样化的话语工具箱的指责归因策略比通常概念化。该研究表明,政党,特别是当他们参与政府间机构和联合政府时,会采取“更温和”的指责形式。政党体系的纵向一体化也造成了有效的指责障碍,即使在长期危机和几次竞选期间也包含了自私自利的战略。我们感谢两位审稿人对本文早期版本的有益和建设性意见,感谢Akseli Paillette-Liettilä、Jonathan Röders、Polina Khubbeeva、Yannis Wittig和Marek Wessels提供的宝贵研究协助。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1数据集、代码本和进一步的项目文档可在GESIS的数据存储库中获得:https://doi.org/10.7802/2627.2现有文献使用了术语“责任归因”和术语“责任归因”。虽然关于选民和他们对多层次系统的看法的文献通常使用“责任”一词,但更以制度为导向的贡献侧重于“指责”一词。然而,联邦制研究通常用“责任”一词来表示联邦制度中联邦实体的法律或宪法权限。因此,我们更倾向于使用“责备”一词来描述话语归属中的正式责任2000年7月20日《感染保护法》I: 1045),最后由2022年12月20日法案(BGBl)第8b条修订。我:2793)。4不可能分析所有关于Covid-19的议会辩论。根据联邦议院全体会议和16个州议会的议定书,我们初步标记了2020年2月1日至2021年9月26日联邦选举期间在全体会议上讨论的与管理Covid-19有关的所有程序。在此期间,我们总共确定了3117个程序定期讨论以及定义和编码说明的联合规范确保了团队成员对如何编码辩论的共同理解。兰塔奇是由五个编码员编写的。每个编码员在一段时间后回顾他或她的编码语句,并建议对原始编码进行更改。这影响了大约6%的病例。这些更改由团队讨论并相应实现。为了确保编码器之间的可靠性,每10次辩论(总共:21次辩论)再次由第二个编码器编码。第二个编码员同意78%的原始编码策略。最后,每个语句都由(至少)另一个编码员检查:8%的案例被修改或删除。德国联邦议院的10场辩论由两名编码员编码。最初,他们每人编码了五场辩论。然后他们交换辩论,并再次编码其他五场辩论。结果进行了比较,讨论了差异,并最终确定了编码。第三个团队成员最终检查了所有编码的文本部分:6%的案例被重新编码或删除在德国,议会政党团体决定在辩论中代表他们发言的代表(m<s:2> ller等)。Citation2021: 381)。因此,我们可以将在辩论中发言的代表分配到各自的政党。此外,我们把参加辩论的政府代表视为其政党的发言人。这样做是因为认识到,由于作用不同,代表们的发言可能比政府代表的发言更具竞争性和两极化由于基民盟和基社盟在任何一级政府都没有竞争关系,而且目前还不清楚联邦议院的发言人是只代表基民盟,还是代表基社盟,或者由于他们的联合议会党团,我们决定在这里一起考虑他们。从经验上看,基社盟与基民盟的党支部相比,也不是异类。基民盟负责执政的Länder分支中,53%的人支持“推卸责任”,47%的人支持“找替罪羊”。包括基社盟在内,这一数字略有变化,分别为52%和48%。
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Attributing blame: how political parties in Germany leverage cooperative federalism
AbstractThis study investigates how political parties used the federal structure of government for discursive blame attribution strategies in parliamentary debates during the Covid-19 crisis. The analysis focuses on the German case which is considered an embodiment of cooperative federalism. Largely intertwined responsibilities and joint decision making provide incentives for self-serving blame attribution strategies. The empirical investigation includes a qualitative content analysis of 212 parliamentary debates in the Bundestag and the 16 state parliaments. Overall, 2067 statements were manually coded and integrated into a novel dataset. The data reveal a more diverse discursive toolkit of blame attribution strategies than commonly conceptualised. The study demonstrates that parties, especially when they are involved in intergovernmental bodies and coalition governments, resort to ‘softer’ forms of blaming. The vertical integration of the party system also creates an effective blame barrier, containing self-serving strategies even during the prolonged crisis and several election campaigns.Keywords: Cooperative federalismblame attributionparty competitionparliamentary debatesCovid-19 AcknowledgementsWe thank the two reviewers for their helpful and constructive comments on earlier versions of this article and Akseli Paillette-Liettilä, Jonathan Röders, Polina Khubbeeva, Yannis Wittig, and Marek Wessels for their valuable research assistance.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The dataset, codebook, and further project documentation are available at the data repositorium of GESIS: https://doi.org/10.7802/2627.2 The existing literature uses both the term ‘blame attribution’ and the term ‘responsibility attribution’. While the literature on voters and their perceptions of multilevel systems generally uses the term ‘responsibility’, the more institutionally oriented contributions focus on the term ‘blame’. However, federalism research usually means by the term ‘responsibility’ the legal or constitutional competences of federal entities in federal systems. Therefore, we prefer to use the term ‘blame’ to delineate formal responsibilities from discursive ascriptions.3 Infection Protection Act of 20 July 2000 (BGBl. I: 1045), last amended by Article 8b of the Act of 20 December 2022 (BGBl. I: 2793).4 It was not possible to analyse all parliamentary debates on Covid-19. Based on the protocols of the plenary sessions in the Bundestag and the 16 Landtage, we initially marked all procedures related to managing Covid-19 that were debated there between 1 February 2020 and the federal elections on 26 September 2021. In total, we have identified 3117 procedures in this period.5 Regular discussions as well as the joint specification of definitions and coding instructions ensured a common understanding among the team members on how to code the debates. The Landtage were coded by five coders. Each coder reviewed his or her coded statements after some time and suggested changes to the original coding. This affected about 6% of the cases. These changes were discussed by the team and implemented accordingly. To ensure inter-coder reliability, every tenth debate (total: 21 debates) was again coded by a second coder. The second coder agreed with 78% of the originally coded strategies. Finally, each statement was checked by (at least) a second coder: 8% of the cases were adapted or deleted. The 10 debates in the Bundestag were coded by two coders. Initially, they coded five debates each. They then swapped debates and coded again the other five debates. The results were compared, differences were discussed, and the coding finalised. A third team member eventually checked all coded text sections: 6% of the cases were re-coded or deleted.6 In Germany, parliamentary party groups determine the deputies who take the floor for them in the debates (Müller et al. Citation2021: 381). Therefore, we can assign the deputies, speaking in the debates, to their respective party. Moreover, we treat the government representatives in the debates as speakers for their parties. This has been decided in the awareness that due to the different roles, the statements of the deputies can be more competitive and polarised than the ones of government representatives.7 Since the CDU and CSU do not compete at either level of government, and it is not clear whether the speakers in the Bundestag represent only the CDU, CSU, or both due to their joint parliamentary party group, we have decided to consider them together here. Empirically, the CSU is also not an outlier vis-a-vis comparable party branches of the CDU. The CDU’s Länder branches with governing responsibility exhibit 53% for ‘passing responsibility’ and 47% for ‘finding a scapegoat’. Including the CSU, the numbers slightly change to 52% and 48%.8 To determine the exact time periods of the three Covid-19 waves, we refer to the official information of the Robert Koch-Institute (RKI) (Tolksdorf et al. Citation2021). The RKI is the federal government’s institute for surveillance and prevention of infectious diseases and pandemic preparedness. The first wave lasted from 02 March 2020 to 17 May 2020, the second wave from 28 September 2020 to 28 January 2021, and the third wave from 01 February 2021 to 13 June 2021.9 When parties refer to a specific Land or Länder, we had to decide how to determine their party affiliation because they are usually governed by a coalition. We use the party affiliation of the respective minister president as distinction. As they represented the Länder in the meetings of the MPK with the chancellor, the minister presidents played the key role in federal crisis management and especially in the media reporting about it. Therefore, citizens primarily associated the Länder with their minister presidents.10 The five Länder were Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatine, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, and Berlin. The elections in Thuringia were postponed to 2024 as the necessary two-thirds majority for the dissolution of the state parliament (Art. 50, 2; Constitution of Thuringia) could not be achieved.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by Volkswagen Foundation as part of the project ‘Political cohesion under conditions of fiscal scarcity – German federalism in the time of COVID-19 ‘[project number 2021000121] and by the Berlin University Alliance as part of the project ‘The Laws of Social Cohesion (LSC)’.Notes on contributorsAntonios SourisAntonios Souris is Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of German Politics at Freie Universität Berlin. In his dissertation, he investigated EU policy coordination in Germany’s federal system. His research focuses on comparative federalism, parliaments, and the policy areas of transport and housing. [antonios.souris@fu-berlin.de]Sabine KroppSabine Kropp is Professor of German Politics at Freie Universität Berlin. Her primary field of research is comparative federalism and multilevel politics, parliamentarism and public administration, with an emphasis on Germany and post-Soviet countries. Her recent book Emerging Federal Structures in the Post-Cold War Era (co-edited with Soeren Keil, Palgrave Macmillan 2022) investigates emerging and regressing federal structures in unconsolidated federal systems. [sabine.kropp@fu-berlin.de]Christoph NguyenChristoph Nguyen is Lecturer at the Chair of German Politics at Freie Universität Berlin. He received his PhD from Northwestern University. His research focuses on the intersection between affect, ideas, and politics and the use of quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-methods in political science. [christoph.nguyen@fu-berlin.de]
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West European Politics
West European Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
10.00
自引率
7.10%
发文量
58
期刊介绍: West European Politics (WEP)has established itself as one of the most authoritative journals covering political and social issues in Western Europe. It has a substantial reviews section and coverage of all national elections in Western Europe. Its comprehensive scope, embracing all the major political and social developments in all West European countries, including the European Union, makes it essential reading for both political practitioners and academics.
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