LeAnn Luna , Kathleen Schuchard , Danielle Stanley
{"title":"TCJA对CEO薪酬的影响","authors":"LeAnn Luna , Kathleen Schuchard , Danielle Stanley","doi":"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107136","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) expanded the impact of IRC Section 162(m) by disallowing a tax deduction for any compensation over $1 million paid to top executives. Under prior law, qualified performance-based compensation was exempt from the $1 million limit. Using OLS regressions, we examine whether TCJA affected CEO compensation immediately after enactment. We find evidence that CEO salaries, non-equity incentive pay, stock awards and total compensation are all higher after TCJA. While the law change increases the after-tax cost of compensation for the average firm, our results show that TCJA did not constrain CEO compensation. However, relative to the average effect, in cross-sectional analyses, we find some evidence that compensation was lower for strong CEOs post TCJA. We also find some evidence that CEOs at firms with high leverage and net deferred tax assets, including tax net operating losses, saw a decrease in various types of incentive compensation post TCJA.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48070,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The impact of TCJA on CEO compensation\",\"authors\":\"LeAnn Luna , Kathleen Schuchard , Danielle Stanley\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2023.107136\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) expanded the impact of IRC Section 162(m) by disallowing a tax deduction for any compensation over $1 million paid to top executives. Under prior law, qualified performance-based compensation was exempt from the $1 million limit. Using OLS regressions, we examine whether TCJA affected CEO compensation immediately after enactment. We find evidence that CEO salaries, non-equity incentive pay, stock awards and total compensation are all higher after TCJA. While the law change increases the after-tax cost of compensation for the average firm, our results show that TCJA did not constrain CEO compensation. However, relative to the average effect, in cross-sectional analyses, we find some evidence that compensation was lower for strong CEOs post TCJA. We also find some evidence that CEOs at firms with high leverage and net deferred tax assets, including tax net operating losses, saw a decrease in various types of incentive compensation post TCJA.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48070,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425423000960\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Accounting and Public Policy","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278425423000960","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) expanded the impact of IRC Section 162(m) by disallowing a tax deduction for any compensation over $1 million paid to top executives. Under prior law, qualified performance-based compensation was exempt from the $1 million limit. Using OLS regressions, we examine whether TCJA affected CEO compensation immediately after enactment. We find evidence that CEO salaries, non-equity incentive pay, stock awards and total compensation are all higher after TCJA. While the law change increases the after-tax cost of compensation for the average firm, our results show that TCJA did not constrain CEO compensation. However, relative to the average effect, in cross-sectional analyses, we find some evidence that compensation was lower for strong CEOs post TCJA. We also find some evidence that CEOs at firms with high leverage and net deferred tax assets, including tax net operating losses, saw a decrease in various types of incentive compensation post TCJA.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Accounting and Public Policy publishes research papers focusing on the intersection between accounting and public policy. Preference is given to papers illuminating through theoretical or empirical analysis, the effects of accounting on public policy and vice-versa. Subjects treated in this journal include the interface of accounting with economics, political science, sociology, or law. The Journal includes a section entitled Accounting Letters. This section publishes short research articles that should not exceed approximately 3,000 words. The objective of this section is to facilitate the rapid dissemination of important accounting research. Accordingly, articles submitted to this section will be reviewed within fours weeks of receipt, revisions will be limited to one, and publication will occur within four months of acceptance.
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
分享
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
扫码关注我们
