Adversarial Power-Sharing and “Forced Marriages”: Governing Coalitions in Lebanon and Yemen

Abstract How do power-sharing governing coalitions work in the context of politicized identities and external pressures? And how do they emerge, develop, and disintegrate when governing parties share power in the context of colliding agendas? Working on the premise that coalition governments may be messy constellations of power, rather than rational avenues for deliberation, this article explores the politics of coalitions in the Middle East as a case of adversarial power-sharing, or what we frame as ‘forced marriages.’ We focus on Yemen and Lebanon, two polities that have developed power-sharing arrangements in conflict-laden environments, albeit under different circumstances and logics of state-building. We argue that while both countries are different on a wide range of variables, they have broader lessons to convey on the ways coalition governments perform and the policy consequences they yield. Throughout both countries’ political history, coalition governance patterns have led to political fragmentation and policy gridlock. However, the puzzle is that notwithstanding antagonistic policy agendas and despite popular disaffection with ruling arrangements, coalition governments have kept re-emerging. This requires an incisive look into the relational and complex dynamics that sustain their logic.