{"title":"工业家:全国制造商协会如何塑造美国资本主义","authors":"Ron Schatz","doi":"10.1215/15476715-10329989","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Before reading Jennifer Delton's book, I thought of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) as a parochial, nationalist, protectionist, conservative organization that fought furiously against unions and was founded by midsized midwestern companies in the 1890s to promote American manufacturing goods overseas. This view, which I imagine is common among labor historians, is not entirely accurate. The NAM was more complicated than that, as Jennifer Delton demonstrates in her highly informative study of the association from its founding until today.To begin, although the large majority of the association's members were small and midsized manufacturers, it also enrolled the presidents of the largest manufacturing corporations in the United States. During its most influential period, in the early twentieth century, it was led by David Perry, who owned the country's largest carriage-manufacturing plant. Perry's factory covered six city blocks in Indianapolis and employed 2,800 workers. Perry also owned and directed other companies. Small companies paid low annual dues to the NAM; large ones paid far more and, not surprisingly, carried greater weight in the association's decision-making. The NAM was not exclusively midwestern either. On the contrary, the initiative for the association came from southern manufacturers as well as Ohioans; consequently, the membership encompassed both Republicans and Democrats. The formation of the NAM in 1895 was part of the larger bonding of southern and northern institutions a generation after the Civil War. It is also a mistake to view the association as systematically protectionist. Denton explains that the NAM was often internally divided on the question of tariffs, as one would expect from a mixed group of southern and northern manufacturers, and consequently often opted not to take a stand on that subject.The NAM led the Open Shop Drive against AFL unions beginning in 1903 and remained unqualifiedly hostile to unions through the mid-1930s. Over time, however, the association's leaders and staff moderated their stance. While some of the members never changed their views, the NAM staff who helped shape the Taft-Hartley Act conceded the legitimacy of unions and collective bargaining in exchange for sharp limitations on union practices. Denton describes the 1947 law as “a peace of sorts, a settlement, in NAM's long-running war against big unions” (136).By the 1980s the NAM was led by a Democrat: Alexander Trowbridge, an Allied Chemical executive who had previously served as secretary of commerce in the Johnson administration. Its chief economist, Jerry Jasinowski, was a former aide to Senator Hubert Humphrey, who in that capacity had helped craft the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act in 1978. Although the association opposed that law, NAM leaders testified in favor of affirmative action policies in the 1970s and 1980s and even earlier strove to persuade its members to hire, retain, and promote African Americans, other minorities, and women. Ultraconservatives always had a home in the NAM, Denton notes, but after World War II its officers and especially the staff were “more pragmatic, more influenced by business and management schools, and less committed to ‘rugged individualism’ ” (188).From its founding the NAM consistently pressed for promotion of foreign trade throughout the world, including with the Soviet Union as early as the 1920s and the Peoples Republic of China beginning in the 1970s. The association officially supported the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods Agreement, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, the International Chamber of Commerce, the World Court, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and even the United Nations, despite resistance from more than a few of the members. The NAM was an early and consistent proponent of globalization.By the 1980s, however, the association was in a quandary. As a conservative business group, the NAM ardently supported Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential election and in most realms loyally supported his administration. Yet much like conservative Christians, who received little beyond words from the administration, the triumph of Reagan and his ideas “offered very little to old-line manufacturers, NAM's bread-and-butter” (265), Denton observed. The widespread plant closings of the 1980s hurt not only millions of factory workers and American unions but also NAM members who were the targets of hostile takeovers. In fact, by the mid-1980s the NAM had much in common with the AFL-CIO. Both were trying to protect “smokestack” industries, both were losing members, and both were alienated from their historical political parties. NAM president Trowbridge reached out to AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland to see if they could “bury the hatchet.” Although nothing came out of this entreaty, the gesture itself was a sign of NAM's dilemma. Denton argues that Reagan's economic policies favored real estate, finance, and technology sectors, while giving little to traditional manufacturing firms (266).Although the NAM revived during the Clinton administration, by the turn of the twenty-first century the organization was a shadow of its former self, with fewer members and less influence than the US Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, or the Conference Board. “Having tied its fortunes to economic globalization, having welcomed into its fold companies from other countries [such as Toyota], having shared its know-how over the decades with foreign manufacturers, NAM constantly pushed beyond the ‘National’ in its name and eventually created a world where it no longer makes sense to talk about US manufacturing, or any other nation's manufacturing” (316), Denton concludes.This insightful history of the National Association of Manufacturers belongs on labor historians’ bookshelves along with other such fine studies of US business, including Judith Stein's Pivotal Decade, Marc Linder's Wars of Attrition, and Kim Phillips-Fein's Invisible Hands.","PeriodicalId":43329,"journal":{"name":"Labor-Studies in Working-Class History of the Americas","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Industrialists: How the National Association of Manufacturers Shaped American Capitalism\",\"authors\":\"Ron Schatz\",\"doi\":\"10.1215/15476715-10329989\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Before reading Jennifer Delton's book, I thought of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) as a parochial, nationalist, protectionist, conservative organization that fought furiously against unions and was founded by midsized midwestern companies in the 1890s to promote American manufacturing goods overseas. This view, which I imagine is common among labor historians, is not entirely accurate. The NAM was more complicated than that, as Jennifer Delton demonstrates in her highly informative study of the association from its founding until today.To begin, although the large majority of the association's members were small and midsized manufacturers, it also enrolled the presidents of the largest manufacturing corporations in the United States. During its most influential period, in the early twentieth century, it was led by David Perry, who owned the country's largest carriage-manufacturing plant. Perry's factory covered six city blocks in Indianapolis and employed 2,800 workers. Perry also owned and directed other companies. Small companies paid low annual dues to the NAM; large ones paid far more and, not surprisingly, carried greater weight in the association's decision-making. The NAM was not exclusively midwestern either. On the contrary, the initiative for the association came from southern manufacturers as well as Ohioans; consequently, the membership encompassed both Republicans and Democrats. The formation of the NAM in 1895 was part of the larger bonding of southern and northern institutions a generation after the Civil War. It is also a mistake to view the association as systematically protectionist. Denton explains that the NAM was often internally divided on the question of tariffs, as one would expect from a mixed group of southern and northern manufacturers, and consequently often opted not to take a stand on that subject.The NAM led the Open Shop Drive against AFL unions beginning in 1903 and remained unqualifiedly hostile to unions through the mid-1930s. Over time, however, the association's leaders and staff moderated their stance. While some of the members never changed their views, the NAM staff who helped shape the Taft-Hartley Act conceded the legitimacy of unions and collective bargaining in exchange for sharp limitations on union practices. Denton describes the 1947 law as “a peace of sorts, a settlement, in NAM's long-running war against big unions” (136).By the 1980s the NAM was led by a Democrat: Alexander Trowbridge, an Allied Chemical executive who had previously served as secretary of commerce in the Johnson administration. Its chief economist, Jerry Jasinowski, was a former aide to Senator Hubert Humphrey, who in that capacity had helped craft the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act in 1978. Although the association opposed that law, NAM leaders testified in favor of affirmative action policies in the 1970s and 1980s and even earlier strove to persuade its members to hire, retain, and promote African Americans, other minorities, and women. Ultraconservatives always had a home in the NAM, Denton notes, but after World War II its officers and especially the staff were “more pragmatic, more influenced by business and management schools, and less committed to ‘rugged individualism’ ” (188).From its founding the NAM consistently pressed for promotion of foreign trade throughout the world, including with the Soviet Union as early as the 1920s and the Peoples Republic of China beginning in the 1970s. The association officially supported the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods Agreement, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, the International Chamber of Commerce, the World Court, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and even the United Nations, despite resistance from more than a few of the members. The NAM was an early and consistent proponent of globalization.By the 1980s, however, the association was in a quandary. As a conservative business group, the NAM ardently supported Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential election and in most realms loyally supported his administration. Yet much like conservative Christians, who received little beyond words from the administration, the triumph of Reagan and his ideas “offered very little to old-line manufacturers, NAM's bread-and-butter” (265), Denton observed. The widespread plant closings of the 1980s hurt not only millions of factory workers and American unions but also NAM members who were the targets of hostile takeovers. In fact, by the mid-1980s the NAM had much in common with the AFL-CIO. Both were trying to protect “smokestack” industries, both were losing members, and both were alienated from their historical political parties. NAM president Trowbridge reached out to AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland to see if they could “bury the hatchet.” Although nothing came out of this entreaty, the gesture itself was a sign of NAM's dilemma. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
在阅读Jennifer Delton的书之前,我认为全国制造商协会(NAM)是一个狭隘的、民族主义的、保护主义的、保守的组织,它在19世纪90年代由中西部的中型公司成立,旨在向海外推广美国制造业产品。我想这种观点在劳工历史学家中很常见,但并不完全准确。不结盟运动要比这复杂得多,正如詹妮弗·德尔顿(Jennifer Delton)在她对该协会从成立到今天的高度翔实的研究中所展示的那样。首先,尽管该协会的绝大多数成员是中小型制造商,但它也招收了美国最大的制造公司的总裁。在其最具影响力的时期,即20世纪初,由戴维·佩里(David Perry)领导,他拥有全国最大的马车制造厂。佩里的工厂覆盖了印第安纳波利斯的六个街区,雇佣了2800名工人。佩里还拥有并指导其他公司。小公司向不结盟运动缴纳的年费很低;大公司的薪酬要高得多,毫不奇怪,它们在协会的决策中占有更大的份量。不结盟运动也不完全是中西部的。相反,成立该协会的倡议不仅来自俄亥俄州,也来自南部的制造商;因此,委员会成员既包括共和党人,也包括民主党人。1895年不结盟运动的成立,是南北战争后一代人建立的更大的南北机构联系的一部分。将欧盟视为系统性保护主义也是错误的。丹顿解释说,不结盟运动内部在关税问题上经常存在分歧,正如人们所预料的那样,这是一个由南方和北方制造商组成的混合集团,因此经常选择在这个问题上不采取立场。不结盟运动从1903年开始领导了反对劳联工会的开放商店运动,并在20世纪30年代中期对工会保持无条件的敌意。然而,随着时间的推移,该协会的领导和工作人员缓和了他们的立场。虽然一些成员从未改变他们的观点,但帮助制定《塔夫脱-哈特利法案》的不结盟运动工作人员承认工会和集体谈判的合法性,以换取对工会行为的严格限制。丹顿将1947年的法律描述为“不结盟运动与大工会的长期战争中的一种和平,一种解决方案”(136)。到20世纪80年代,不结盟运动由一位民主党人领导:亚历山大·特罗布里奇(Alexander Trowbridge),他是联合化学公司(Allied Chemical)的高管,曾在约翰逊政府中担任商务部长。其首席经济学家杰里·贾西诺夫斯基(Jerry Jasinowski)曾是参议员休伯特·汉弗莱(Hubert Humphrey)的助手,汉弗莱曾以汉弗莱-霍金斯充分就业法案(Humphrey- hawkins Full Employment Act)的起草工作。尽管该协会反对这项法律,但不结盟运动的领导人在20世纪70年代和80年代作证支持平权行动政策,甚至更早的时候,他们努力说服其成员雇用、保留和提拔非裔美国人、其他少数民族和妇女。丹顿指出,极端保守主义者一直在不结盟运动中有自己的根基,但二战后,不结盟运动的军官,尤其是参谋“更加务实,更多地受到商业和管理学院的影响,不再那么坚持‘粗犷的个人主义’”(188)。不结盟运动从成立之初就一直致力于在世界范围内促进对外贸易,包括早在20世纪20年代就与苏联和20世纪70年代开始与中华人民共和国的贸易。该协会正式支持马歇尔计划、布雷顿森林协定、关税及贸易总协定、国际商会、世界法院、经济合作与发展组织,甚至联合国,尽管有不少成员反对。不结盟运动是全球化的早期和一贯的支持者。然而,到了20世纪80年代,该协会陷入了两难境地。作为一个保守的商业集团,不结盟运动在1980年的总统选举中热情地支持罗纳德·里根,并在大多数领域忠实地支持他的政府。然而,就像保守的基督徒一样,他们几乎没有从政府那里得到什么,里根的胜利和他的想法“几乎没有给老牌制造商提供什么,不结盟运动的面包和黄油”(265),丹顿观察到。20世纪80年代大规模的工厂关闭不仅伤害了数以百万计的工厂工人和美国工会,也伤害了不结盟运动的成员,他们是敌意收购的目标。事实上,到20世纪80年代中期,不结盟运动与劳联-产联有很多共同之处。两党都在努力保护“烟囱”工业,都在失去党员,都与各自的政党疏远。不结盟运动主席特罗布里奇联系了劳联-产联主席莱恩·柯克兰,看他们是否能“和解”。尽管这一恳求没有任何结果,但这一姿态本身就是不结盟运动陷入困境的一个迹象。 丹顿认为,里根的经济政策偏向于房地产、金融和技术部门,而对传统制造业的扶持很少(266)。尽管不结盟运动在克林顿政府时期恢复了活力,但到21世纪之交时,该组织已是昔日的影子,成员数量和影响力不如美国商会、商业圆桌会议、全国独立企业联合会或世界大型企业联合会。丹顿总结道:“不结盟运动将自己的财富与经济全球化联系在一起,欢迎其他国家的公司(如丰田)进入自己的圈子,几十年来与外国制造商分享自己的专有技术,不断地超越其名称中的‘国家’,最终创造了一个世界,在那里谈论美国制造业或任何其他国家的制造业都不再有意义。”这本关于全美制造商协会(National Association of Manufacturers)的深刻历史著作,与朱迪思·斯坦(Judith Stein)的《关键十年》(Pivotal Decade)、马克·林德(Marc Linder)的《消耗战》(Wars of消耗)和金·菲利普斯-费恩(Kim Phillips-Fein)的《看不见的手》(Invisible Hands)等其他有关美国商业的优秀研究一样,都属于劳工历史学家的书架。
The Industrialists: How the National Association of Manufacturers Shaped American Capitalism
Before reading Jennifer Delton's book, I thought of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) as a parochial, nationalist, protectionist, conservative organization that fought furiously against unions and was founded by midsized midwestern companies in the 1890s to promote American manufacturing goods overseas. This view, which I imagine is common among labor historians, is not entirely accurate. The NAM was more complicated than that, as Jennifer Delton demonstrates in her highly informative study of the association from its founding until today.To begin, although the large majority of the association's members were small and midsized manufacturers, it also enrolled the presidents of the largest manufacturing corporations in the United States. During its most influential period, in the early twentieth century, it was led by David Perry, who owned the country's largest carriage-manufacturing plant. Perry's factory covered six city blocks in Indianapolis and employed 2,800 workers. Perry also owned and directed other companies. Small companies paid low annual dues to the NAM; large ones paid far more and, not surprisingly, carried greater weight in the association's decision-making. The NAM was not exclusively midwestern either. On the contrary, the initiative for the association came from southern manufacturers as well as Ohioans; consequently, the membership encompassed both Republicans and Democrats. The formation of the NAM in 1895 was part of the larger bonding of southern and northern institutions a generation after the Civil War. It is also a mistake to view the association as systematically protectionist. Denton explains that the NAM was often internally divided on the question of tariffs, as one would expect from a mixed group of southern and northern manufacturers, and consequently often opted not to take a stand on that subject.The NAM led the Open Shop Drive against AFL unions beginning in 1903 and remained unqualifiedly hostile to unions through the mid-1930s. Over time, however, the association's leaders and staff moderated their stance. While some of the members never changed their views, the NAM staff who helped shape the Taft-Hartley Act conceded the legitimacy of unions and collective bargaining in exchange for sharp limitations on union practices. Denton describes the 1947 law as “a peace of sorts, a settlement, in NAM's long-running war against big unions” (136).By the 1980s the NAM was led by a Democrat: Alexander Trowbridge, an Allied Chemical executive who had previously served as secretary of commerce in the Johnson administration. Its chief economist, Jerry Jasinowski, was a former aide to Senator Hubert Humphrey, who in that capacity had helped craft the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Act in 1978. Although the association opposed that law, NAM leaders testified in favor of affirmative action policies in the 1970s and 1980s and even earlier strove to persuade its members to hire, retain, and promote African Americans, other minorities, and women. Ultraconservatives always had a home in the NAM, Denton notes, but after World War II its officers and especially the staff were “more pragmatic, more influenced by business and management schools, and less committed to ‘rugged individualism’ ” (188).From its founding the NAM consistently pressed for promotion of foreign trade throughout the world, including with the Soviet Union as early as the 1920s and the Peoples Republic of China beginning in the 1970s. The association officially supported the Marshall Plan, the Bretton Woods Agreement, the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, the International Chamber of Commerce, the World Court, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and even the United Nations, despite resistance from more than a few of the members. The NAM was an early and consistent proponent of globalization.By the 1980s, however, the association was in a quandary. As a conservative business group, the NAM ardently supported Ronald Reagan in the 1980 presidential election and in most realms loyally supported his administration. Yet much like conservative Christians, who received little beyond words from the administration, the triumph of Reagan and his ideas “offered very little to old-line manufacturers, NAM's bread-and-butter” (265), Denton observed. The widespread plant closings of the 1980s hurt not only millions of factory workers and American unions but also NAM members who were the targets of hostile takeovers. In fact, by the mid-1980s the NAM had much in common with the AFL-CIO. Both were trying to protect “smokestack” industries, both were losing members, and both were alienated from their historical political parties. NAM president Trowbridge reached out to AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland to see if they could “bury the hatchet.” Although nothing came out of this entreaty, the gesture itself was a sign of NAM's dilemma. Denton argues that Reagan's economic policies favored real estate, finance, and technology sectors, while giving little to traditional manufacturing firms (266).Although the NAM revived during the Clinton administration, by the turn of the twenty-first century the organization was a shadow of its former self, with fewer members and less influence than the US Chamber of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, or the Conference Board. “Having tied its fortunes to economic globalization, having welcomed into its fold companies from other countries [such as Toyota], having shared its know-how over the decades with foreign manufacturers, NAM constantly pushed beyond the ‘National’ in its name and eventually created a world where it no longer makes sense to talk about US manufacturing, or any other nation's manufacturing” (316), Denton concludes.This insightful history of the National Association of Manufacturers belongs on labor historians’ bookshelves along with other such fine studies of US business, including Judith Stein's Pivotal Decade, Marc Linder's Wars of Attrition, and Kim Phillips-Fein's Invisible Hands.