担保信贷和破产解决

IF 1.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Pub Date : 2023-11-08 DOI:10.1111/jels.12370
Barry E. Adler, Vedran Capkun
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要公认的观点认为,即使债务人作为持续经营的企业可能更有价值,有担保债权人也倾向于清算破产中的债务人。然而,这是错误的智慧。优先债权的持有人可能倾向于在债务人破产之前进行清算,因为这种债权的回报受到所欠金额的限制,而债务人的资产价值则在波动。但破产是清算的一天,可以消除债权人对价值波动的敞口。由于这个原因,我们期望现代破产实践,有担保债权人往往牢牢控制,不会过度鼓励清算。事实上,我们预计任何有利于重组的偏见都可以被操纵,以使控制破产程序的任何一方受益。我们的结果与这个假设是一致的。在对美国企业破产案例的广泛研究中,我们发现担保信贷与资不抵债债务人的重组呈正相关且显著。
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Secured credit and bankruptcy resolution

Accepted wisdom holds that secured creditors favor liquidation of a debtor in bankruptcy even where the debtor may be more valuable as a going concern. This is false wisdom, however. Holders of senior claims can be expected to favor liquidation prior to a debtor's bankruptcy because the return on such claims are capped by the amount owed while debtor asset values fluctuate. But bankruptcy is a day of reckoning that can eliminate a creditor's exposure to value fluctuation. For this reason, we expect that modern bankruptcy practice, with the secured creditor often firmly in control, does not unduly encourage liquidation. In fact, we expect any bias to favor reorganization, which can be manipulated for the benefit of any party in control of the bankruptcy process. Our results are consistent with this hypothesis. In a broad study of US corporate bankruptcy cases, we find that secured credit is positively and significantly correlated with the reorganization of insolvent debtors.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
11.80%
发文量
34
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