招聘中的歧视:来自零售业的证据

IF 5.9 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS Review of Economic Studies Pub Date : 2023-09-04 DOI:10.1093/restud/rdad087
Alan M Benson, Simon Board, Moritz Meyer-ter-vehn
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文提出了一个简单的招聘种族偏见模型,该模型包含三个主要理论:品味歧视、筛选歧视和互补生产。我们根据不同种族对管理者下工人生产率的均值和方差,推导出一个可以区分这些理论的检验。我们使用48,755名新雇佣的提成销售人员的数据,将这个测试应用于美国一家大型零售商的歧视研究。同一家商店的白人、黑人和西班牙裔经理明显更有可能雇佣自己种族的员工,这与所有三个理论都是一致的。对于黑人-西班牙裔伴侣,同种族伴侣的生产率差异低于跨种族伴侣,这意味着筛选歧视占主导地位。对于白人-西班牙裔配对,同种族配对的平均生产率更高,表明筛选歧视和互补生产的结合。对于白人和黑人,有偏见的雇佣意味着歧视的存在,但生产率结果表明,三种形式的歧视的影响相互抵消。
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Discrimination in Hiring: Evidence from Retail Sales
Abstract We propose a simple model of racial bias in hiring that encompasses three major theories: taste-based discrimination, screening discrimination, and complementary production. We derive a test that can distinguish these theories based on the mean and variance of workers’ productivity under managers of different pairs of races. We apply this test to study discrimination at a major U.S. retailer using data from 48,755 newly hired commission-based salespeople. White, black, and Hispanic managers within the same store are significantly more likely to hire workers of their own race, consistent with all three theories. For black–Hispanic pairs, productivity variance is lower for same-race pairs than cross-race pairs, implying that screening discrimination dominates. For white–Hispanic pairs, mean productivity is higher for same-race pairs, indicating a combination of screening discrimination and complementary production. For white–black pairs, biased hiring implies the presence of discrimination, but productivity results suggest the effects of the three forms of discrimination offset one another.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.40
自引率
3.40%
发文量
75
期刊介绍: Founded in 1933 by a group of young British and American economists, The Review of Economic Studies aims to encourage research in theoretical and applied economics, especially by young economists. Today it is widely recognised as one of the core top-five economics journals. The Review is essential reading for economists and has a reputation for publishing path-breaking papers in theoretical and applied economics. The Review is committed to continuing to publish strong papers in all areas of economics. The Editors aim to provide an efficient and high-quality review process to the Review''s authors. Where articles are sent out for full review, authors receive careful reports and feedback. Since 1989 The Review has held annual May Meetings to offer young students in economics and finance the chance to present their research to audiences in Europe.
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