移动边缘计算中基于Stackelberg博弈的数据质量感知激励机制

IF 0.4 4区 计算机科学 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, HARDWARE & ARCHITECTURE Ieice Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.1587/transfun.2023eap1022
Shuyun LUO, Wushuang WANG, Yifei LI, Jian HOU, Lu ZHANG
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引用次数: 0

摘要

众包成为一种流行的数据收集方法,以减轻数据收集的高成本和延迟负担。由于参与众包的用户是志愿者,所以需要激励措施来鼓励他们提供数据。然而,目前的激励机制大多关注数据的数量,而忽略了数据的质量。本文设计了一种基于Stackelberg博弈的协同任务数据质量感知激励机制(data -quality awaRe IncentiVe mEchanism, DRIVE),以激励高质量用户,其中重点是基于所提出的数据质量评价方法的动态奖励分配方案。为了保证数据质量评估响应的实时性,我们引入了移动边缘计算框架。最后,给出了一个实例,其实际数据实验证明了DRIVE的优越性能。
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Data-quality Aware Incentive Mechanism based on Stackelberg Game in Mobile Edge Computing
Crowdsourcing becomes a popular data-collection method to relieve the burden of high cost and latency for data-gathering. Since the involved users in crowdsourcing are volunteers, need incentives to encourage them to provide data. However, the current incentive mechanisms mostly pay attention to the data quantity, while ignoring the data quality. In this paper, we design a Data-quality awaRe IncentiVe mEchanism (DRIVE) for collaborative tasks based on the Stackelberg game to motivate users with high quality, the highlight of which is the dynamic reward allocation scheme based on the proposed data quality evaluation method. In order to guarantee the data quality evaluation response in real-time, we introduce the mobile edge computing framework. Finally, one case study is given and its real-data experiments demonstrate the superior performance of DRIVE.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
20.00%
发文量
137
审稿时长
3.9 months
期刊介绍: Includes reports on research, developments, and examinations performed by the Society''s members for the specific fields shown in the category list such as detailed below, the contents of which may advance the development of science and industry: (1) Reports on new theories, experiments with new contents, or extensions of and supplements to conventional theories and experiments. (2) Reports on development of measurement technology and various applied technologies. (3) Reports on the planning, design, manufacture, testing, or operation of facilities, machinery, parts, materials, etc. (4) Presentation of new methods, suggestion of new angles, ideas, systematization, software, or any new facts regarding the above.
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