{"title":"因果解释和揭示的偏好","authors":"Kate Vredenburgh","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.112","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper tackles the objection that revealed preferences cannot causally explain. I mount a causal explanatory defense by drawing out three conditions under which such preferences can explain well, using an example of a successful explanation using behavioral preferences. When behavioral preferences are multiple realizable, they can causally explain behavior well. Behavioral preferences also explain when agential preferences cannot be analytically separated from the environment that produces the relevant behavior (Condition 2), and when the environment is a significant causal factor (Condition 3). Thus, there are not causal explanatory grounds to completely bar revealed preference explanations from social science.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"37 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Causal Explanation and Revealed Preferences\",\"authors\":\"Kate Vredenburgh\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/psa.2023.112\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This paper tackles the objection that revealed preferences cannot causally explain. I mount a causal explanatory defense by drawing out three conditions under which such preferences can explain well, using an example of a successful explanation using behavioral preferences. When behavioral preferences are multiple realizable, they can causally explain behavior well. Behavioral preferences also explain when agential preferences cannot be analytically separated from the environment that produces the relevant behavior (Condition 2), and when the environment is a significant causal factor (Condition 3). Thus, there are not causal explanatory grounds to completely bar revealed preference explanations from social science.\",\"PeriodicalId\":54620,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophy of Science\",\"volume\":\"37 6\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophy of Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.112\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.112","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper tackles the objection that revealed preferences cannot causally explain. I mount a causal explanatory defense by drawing out three conditions under which such preferences can explain well, using an example of a successful explanation using behavioral preferences. When behavioral preferences are multiple realizable, they can causally explain behavior well. Behavioral preferences also explain when agential preferences cannot be analytically separated from the environment that produces the relevant behavior (Condition 2), and when the environment is a significant causal factor (Condition 3). Thus, there are not causal explanatory grounds to completely bar revealed preference explanations from social science.
期刊介绍：
Since its inception in 1934, Philosophy of Science, along with its sponsoring society, the Philosophy of Science Association, has been dedicated to the furthering of studies and free discussion from diverse standpoints in the philosophy of science. The journal contains essays, discussion articles, and book reviews.
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