Psychic immunity and uncomprehended pain: what Maimonides can tell us about the problem of suffering

Abstract Using Moses Maimonides’ theodicy to respond to contemporary formulations of the problem of evil initially seems unpromising. Maimonides is committed to claims that make the task harder rather than easier. Chief among them is his belief that all suffering is deserved by the sufferer. But Maimonides is often misinterpreted: he does not hold that innocent people are never subject to bodily harm, but that it is possible to achieve a kind of ‘psychic immunity’ from suffering via intellectual enlightenment, and that failure to do so is blameworthy. I argue that while the Maimonidean psychic immunity theodicy has some attractive features, it struggles to explain ‘inculpably incomprehensible’ suffering: that of infants and people with serious cognitive disabilities. I propose two responses: defending Maimonides’ intellectual elitism using work on moral status from Singer and McMahan; and defending a more limited version of the theodicy grounded on ‘sceptical’ readings of Maimonides that emphasize the limitations of human knowledge. I conclude that the second is more promising, and that the limits of Maimonides’ theodicy point to more general limits on theodicies that insist on what I call ‘first-personal adequacy’ – the requirement that a theodicy provide a satisfying explanation of suffering to sufferers themselves.